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since I first took his class called Asian Economic History in my sophomore year. Thank you for 
keeping me motivated, having faith in me and my project, and keeping up with my tardiness.  
 I guess I decided to write about gender empowerment out of an academic interest. That 
summer before my senior year, I had been introduced to gender studies for the first time in 
professor Mackintosh's class, and I came back to bard eager to learn more and possibly make a 
senior project out of it. But giving it a second thought, this can't be the whole reason why. If I 
were to name a few people that made my time at bard what it was, it would always come down to 
several incredible women, who came into my life at bard at different times, and left a mark on me 
that will stay for a life time. So there has to be a correlation (I’m clearly making up for a lack of 
econometrics in my project). They were a few fine men too, but they can wait.  
 Although I don't have a space to thank all of them, I want them to thank at least a few. I 
will never be able to write down how much Manishka's help has meant to me over these past 4 
years. Because she has helped me through almost everything I could imagine. She even would 
reach out to me before I realized I needed help. In my mind, she will always be in Bard, and I 
will always remember this place through her.  
 Blaga and Anushka were some of my first friends at bard. They remain as my big sisters. 
Thanks for all the scolding in my freshmen year, I appreciated it a lot more than I ever showed it 
then. Thank you for caring so much.   
 I think the reason I've taken each of Pavlina's classes, including one this semester, is 
because she never ceases to inspire me and put me in awe of her work. At times I've felt that I 
couldn't do something, like majoring in economics, she had faith in me and told me that I could. 
But she's also constantly pushed me and challenged me. And it has been both terrifying and so 
rewarding. Thank you for always being a figure for so many of us to look up to. 
 Ayesha is the reason I am surrounded by six beautiful, loving friends. I think that says a 
lot about how much each of us value her and are thankful to have her in our lives. They are 
Becca, Cassandra, Ana Victoria, Mais, Sana, and Adela Foo. The seven of them have filled my 
time at bard with so much laughter and happiness. I couldn't be more proud of all of them, and 
the amazing things they do and will continue to. I’m looking forward to many more years I know 
we will spend together in some way or the other. (50 Shades of Brown and One Shade of Pink 
forever!!!!!)  
 Ria, thank you for all the carbonara, for proof-reading my entire senior project, for 
letting me crash in your place, for being my date every Valentine’s day. I’ll never run out of 
things to thank you for. Thank you, Sara Genung. And finally, my dear neighbor, Emma. Thank 
you coming to my life at last.  
 My professors Laura didi, Bill, Diana, Samantha Hill, Ani Mitra, Chris Machintosh, 
Diedre Albertis, Laurie Dalberg. Nothing has been more motivating than seeing all of you talk 
about things in your classes that you are truly passionate about and care for. Thank you for 
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Abstract 
In my project, I try to trace how our present understanding of gender empowerment is formed, 
and how mainstream economics literature has accommodated feminist contributions to the 
concept. I look at neoclassical household models, feminist critiques of the same models, 
foundational ideas on gender empowerment, and finally the current development economics 
literature on empowerment. I find that the concept of choices and preferences, and in particular 
the formation of preferences, is central to understanding gender empowerment. I deduce that a) 
empowerment is both a process and an outcome, b) that the end goal of empowerment is the 
access to resources as well as individual agency, and c) that empowerment as a process, in the 
intermediary stages, means that women play an active role in defining and creating the 
opportunities that lead them to be empowered. In the current political participation literature, I 
find that the assumption of fixed, individual preferences is losing its quality of being central to 
understanding economic behavior.  
Keywords: individual preferences, empowerment, gender, development 
JEL Classifications: I14, I24, I32, I38, J13, J16, O15
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 Gender empowerment has become the "buzzword" in the development economics 
literature, but despite how prevalent this notion is, there is little “clarity” and consistency over 
what empowerment implies in “economic terms,” and what theories help us understand the 
concept (Baltiwala 1997).  Gender and power are two subtopics that emerge in the study of 
empowering women. My understanding of power in this paper comes from Kabeer (1999), who 
defines it as “an ability to make choices that are of value.” Empowerment then becomes the 
process by which we acquire this ability. (p. 436) But by thinking about power in the dimension 
of choices, I can also draw a link to standard neoclassical economics, which describes behavior 
through the idea of a rational choice. I trace how our understanding of power and gender  has 1
evolved within economic theory, and also how it far it has incorporated feminist conceptions of 
the two terms. For example, earlier household models (Becker 1976, 1981) see gender in 
biological terms. Yet in my final chapter, Stern et al. (2005) talks about how gender roles can be 
changed, as we change preferences. Feminist contribution to economics, as I discuss in this 
paper, has focused on how the preferences are formed, situated individual behavior in their social 
and political context (of gender, race, and class), and suggested that gender roles, and essentially 
 There are several understandings of gender, it can be understood along biological lines, as a product of sex-role 1
socialization, or something that humans perform and construct. Biological determinism suggests suggests that there 
are essential differences between men and women, which also informs a biological division of labour in Becker’s 
(1976, 1981) unitary household models. The sex-role socialization theory highlights that gender is not innate, what 
we learn about masculinity and femininity is determined by society from very early on. We are a product of our 
environment largely shaped by our family or society’s expectations of our sex roles. However, this theory can takes 
us as passive agents, takes away the agency and ability aspect to change behavior. (Tcherneva 2016) We also can 
separate gender from sex, where sex refers to one’s biological differences, and gender is the “social construction of 
[a person’s] sexual identity” (Barker). Finally, men and women can be actively involved in the construction of 
gender. Butler (2009) highlights that gender has a performative aspect, it becomes “a result of something we do, or 
how we perform our identities in day to day lives.” But gender is also more than just our personal feelings or 
expression, it operates within cultural and political institutions. We perform our gender roles as a way to conform 
and reproduce the “ideal” norm. (as cited in Steans 2013, p. 7-46)  
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identities can be changed, by changing institutions and norms that create seemingly fixed ideas 
and images about gender roles (Bourdieu 1977). The concept of choices and preferences, and in 
particular the formation of preferences, is therefore central to understanding gender 
empowerment. 
 The neoclassical household models give us an initial framework for understanding gender 
relations. In subsequent bargaining models, the inequitable share of income and resources also 
reveals the power relations that exist in a household. In the unitary household models, income 
and resources are pooled and distributed by an altruistic head of the household, because 
preferences are uniform. Therefore, these models do not address the gender inequalities that exist 
within a household.  The intra-household bargaining models allow for individual preferences and 
gender inequalities in the distribution of resources, which mirrors our social reality more 
precisely. Power can be linked to an ability to bargain in household resource allocation and 
having a voice in decision making. Bargaining ability is also determined by external factors, and 
this brings in the influence of social norms and institutions into our analysis of decision making. 
However social norms, at this point, are still exogenous to the bargaining processes (Agarwal 
1997). They are given and not changeable.  
 The intra-household bargaining models make the assumption of individual preferences, 
based on the neoclassical rational choice theory. Because people come into the household with 
fixed and given preferences, the model is concerned with the constraints facing a household, in 
terms of choices, prices and costs. Preferences are central to this essay on gender empowerment 
because it is preferences of people that define their wants and needs and ultimately guides them 
to make valuable and strategic choices (Kabeer 1999). Feminist economists, and most notably 
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Amartya Sen, argues that the neoclassical model does not consider the ways preferences are 
formed. Sen (1990) suggests that preferences are formed under the influence of “social norms 
and social experiences” (as cited in Peter 2005, p. 21) so the issue with the conventional model is 
to do with the “formation of the problem itself” (Sen 1990, p. 113).  
 Preferences, are not always individual, and certainly do not remain fixed. This also means 
that when we rely on our individual tastes and preferences to make certain choices (choices 
where we try to maximize utility), we are making a subjective assessment. We have a subjective 
assessment of how we are faring, i.e individual preferences. If we have a weak understanding of 
our wellbeing, because subjective aspects are shaped by social norms, beliefs, and ability to 
express our needs, then the outcome of the bargaining process will be less favorable towards the 
person who attaches less value to their wellbeing (Beneria 2009). Sen (1999, 1990) pushes us 
towards a more objective measure of assessing individual welfare, through his idea of 
capabilities.  
 In Sen's reasoning, women have false or incorrect perceptions, and might conflate their 
self-interests with the interests of the family, they are socialized into becoming more altruistic. 
But how do false perceptions come about? And on what basis are they false? Some feminists, 
such as Kabeer (1999) and Agarwal (1997), have argued that perceptions cannot be false, 
because how we form our needs and desires come through the context of our day to day social 
and material reality, and also through social norms and beliefs or a “deeper level of 
reality” (Kabeer 1999, p. 441).  This is referring to Bordieu’s (1977) theory of “doxa” (p. 159), 2
 I argue in chapter two that while Sen does imply that women have false or incorrect perceptions, the difference 2
between his and other feminists understandings of preference formation, is still in language, and not theory. Sen also 
believes that preferences form because of our social norms and lived experiences, this is the reasoning some of the 
feminists give to why perceptions cannot be false, they are real, because they are based on lived experiences. [cite]
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the idea that there are parts of our culture and traditions that have semblance of being fixed, but 
in reality, they can be changed. Also, while women’s false perceptions can be shaped by norms, 
norms themselves are shaped by lived realities, which are not fixed, and so norms are 
endogenous (Agarwal 1997). Norms can therefore be negotiated and contested over. We can 
bargain over social norms and create new social realities. So if the norms being contested and 
bargained over are gender norms, what we are doing is essentially expanding the choice set 
available to a woman so she will have more possibilities that are socially acceptable.  
 What all of this implies, is that there is not a simple relationship between power and 
choices, because power does not only operate through choices, but also through preferences and 
the choices those preferences makes (Kabeer 1999, p 442). Preferences are formed by people's 
"social experiences and social norms”(Sen 1990, as cited in Peter). So if people are implicated in 
an inequitable power relationship, the choices that they make might be in line with their 
preferences. But here, we cannot simply take power to derive from people's ability to make a 
choice. In Chapter 3, I give an example about a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in India 
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004), which measured the types of complaints that are lodged and 
the public goods that are provided, when women are chiefs of their village councils, through a 
reservations policy for women and minorities. The reservation policy in India mandates that at 
least a third of the elected seats in all village councils be reserved for women, and in a third of 
the village councils, only women are able to be run as chiefs (or Pradhans) of the council. When 
women are leaders, the authors find that they provide public goods in line with the preferences of 
women voters.  
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 But these public goods, do nothing to change prevailing gender roles and do not have a 
"transformative" impact (Kabeer 1999, p. 451). Women might still be in a state of "doxa" where 
they leave the inequities that blight their lives, unquestioned. To move towards a more "critical" 
state of consciousness, where they critically think about and evaluate their position, Kabeer 
(1999) writes that there needs to be an "availability of alternatives at the discursive level" (p. 
441). I understand this as women having an ability to imagine themselves doing more things than 
they thought they were capable of, seeing more to themselves then they thought was possible. 
These are ideas that I come across in Sen (1990, 1999), Kabeer (1999), Agarwal (1997), 
Batliwala (1994) Stern (1999), Appadurai (2004), and Cornwall (2016). In particular, Kabeer’s 
(1999) notion of "alternatives... at the discursive level” echoes Sen's (1990, 1999) capability 
approach, where to analyze a policy outcome, what matters is not what you chose but the choices 
that you had, and could've chosen otherwise. These choices can be both material and imagined. 
The idea of discursive alternatives, and acquiring an ability to envision different possibilities to 
oneself, is central to early feminist concepts of gender empowerment as well, where 
empowerment taught women about their oppression, and how to assert themselves (Baltiwala 
1994).  
 I provide a more concrete example of this idea, in the third chapter, in another RCT from 
West Bengal concerning reservations for women. Beaman et al. (2012) find that reservations 
have a long term, role model effect, by changing the aspirations of parents, and their daughters, 
about what women are capable of, and this leads to an observed difference in education 
attainment of girls. The significance of this finding, is that the reservations do not cause a change 
in any educational or labour market opportunities for adolescent girls. The only channel through 
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which parents were able to alter their perceived gender roles, and girls were able to see more to 
themselves as a result, was by watching women occupy spaces (such as chiefs of their village 
councils) that they could not imagine them in before.   
 These findings from Beaman et al. (2012) are also the effect of a change in preferences of 
parents as well as girls. Change of preferences is one of the key dynamics of empowerment for 
Stern et al. (2005). When people are empowered, their “social and economic” conditions may 
have changed, (p. 243) but there is also a change in what they prefer, want, or aspire to be. But 
how do we empirically separate an change in preference effects from change in information 
effect? (p. 252) In standard (neoclassical) economic analysis, an increase in the attainment of 
education for girls could be explained by a the fact that labour market opportunities for girls has 
increased, or parents have more information on the returns to education. Duflo (2012), in her 
literature review of gender empowerment, provides this as an example of how development can 
lead to women's empowerment. These are important channels, and for Stern et al. (2005) 
“relaxing the external constraints” facing women is one of the aspects of empowerment (p. ). 
However, in this instance, Beaman et al. (2012) show that there was no change in labour market 
opportunities from reservations, and the study also control for any effects that educational and 
labour market attainments of young adults would have had on parents of adolescent daughters 
(since these parents would have looked to that group to receive information about the returns to 
education).   
 Yet we still see a potential for a change in gender roles, as parents are able to imagine 
their daughters in newer roles, and the gender gap for education attainment decreases. If an 
individual's preferences are socially constructed, this sets forth a positive feedback mechanism 
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for girls themselves, who are able to see a different role for themselves by observing other 
women occupy a new and public decision space, and for parents, who begin to change their 
perceptions of their daughters. 
 But is this case a reflection of gender empowerment? Who is being empowered: the 
daughter, the parents, or the women leaders? And most importantly, what does an empowered 
woman look like?  
 I conclude chapter 2 with writing about the implications of critiques that have come out 
of the bargaining models, and what it means for gender empowerment. I try and bring in together 
primarily the works of Sen (1990, 1999), Agarwal (1997), Batliwala (1994), and Kabeer (1999). 
Empowerment is widely viewed, across different literatures, as both an end in itself and a process 
(Kabeer 1999, Duflo 2012, World Bank 2012). But I want to emphasize that the end goal of 
empowerment should reflect access and control of resources, as well as individual agency, where 
agency is defined as an individual’s ability to "define their goals and act on them" (Kabeer 1999, 
p. 438), and have the freedom to chose between alternative realities.  The idea that preferences 3
can be changed, or “endogenous preferences,” is at the heart of this process of empowerment 
(Stern 2005, p. 250). In the process of empowerment, an individuals self-perceptions and beliefs 
of themselves can be changed, so they are more in line with their own self-interests, goals and 
aspirations. Since preferences are socially constructed, policy intervention should not just be at 
the level of the individual, but at the level of the community as well. At the beginning of chapter 
 This definition comes from Kabeer, who sees resources and agency as two of the three dimensions of 3
empowerment. Resources and agency come together to constitute as achievement outcomes, the third dimension of 
empowerment. Resources and agencies, together, can also be thought of as Sen’s (1990, 1999) idea of capabilities, 
which highlight the potential for different ways of “being and doing” which is what Sen calls “functioning.” (as 
cited in Kabeer 1999, p. 438). Capabilities can also be thought of as freedom to live the type of lives that value (Sen 
1999). 
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two, for example, I talk about how individuals are social beings, therefore the way to empower 
an individual is to understand their relationship with the society that they are in, and how it 
affects them both positively and negatively.  
 Ultimately, there are different ways of "being and doing," (Sen 1990) but the choices we 
have are constrained by our social norms. We can provide platforms that can be used by 
communities to change social norms and for individuals to change their preferences (Stern 2005, 
p. 262). In the end, each woman will have a larger set of choices that are socially acceptable or 
sanctioned. However, disempowerment is simply not having the ability to choose, but in line 
with individual agency, it is also not having a role, or a space to contribute to the formation and 
negotiation of social norms. In other words, empowerment cannot be given to women (Cornwall 
2016). Empowerment comes from being able to define one’s own preferences, so women should 
have a constructive role in what those choices are. 
 Given this, where do we place the case of about women leaders acting as role models to 
girls? The village council is an important site in which decisions for the community are carried 
out, especially in terms of public goods provisioning (Kabeer 2005). Just having these 
reservations achieves the goal of having women in decision making spaces. They are not only 
merely “present,” but they are also active and “effective participants,” (Stern 2005, p. 105) as 
some of the earliest studies show (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004), where having women as 
leaders lead to provisioning of public goods that are in line with what women in the community 
wanted. But are they expanding the choice sets for other women by simply giving them what 
they want? Here, the Beaman et al. (2012) study points us to believe that having women in those 
spaces, does expand the choice sets for others, and in particular adolescent girls, by changing 
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norms about women's role and what they can achieve. The resources aspect of empowerment, in 
Kabeer's (1999) understanding, means that access to a resource should not only translate to an 
actual choice, but a “potential” for a choice (p. 443). While there is a positive effect on the 
education attainment for girls, an access to more educational resources, should not alone 
constitute as being empowering. The fact that aspirations of parents change positively, towards 
their daughters to be a Pradhan one day, or to marry only after 18 years of age, show that these 
girls also have an access to a potential set of choices in the future, which they did not have 
before.  
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Chapter 1: Critical literature review of the neoclassical household models 
 Empowerment can be seen through dimension of choices, where power comes from an 
“ability to make choices” (Kabeer 1999, p. 436). Power can also be seen in terms of “control 
over material or intellectual resources” (Baltiwala 1994, p. 129), which figures into an 
individual's ability to make choices. In conventional economics, our understanding of how 
choices are made, can be explained by ideas of individual preferences, rational choice and utility 
theory. However, an individual who makes a rational, utility maximizing choice, does not exist in 
a vacuum, the  to a family, is either male or female bodied. The neoclassical household models, 
offer us a framework for how these different entities make choices, or are denied of making 
choices. Choices become materialized in the way that labour is divided, or resources are 
distributed among families. These household models reveal the way that individuals are related 
to one another, and in particular, they bring forward gender relations (Agarwal 1997, p. 1). In 
subsequent bargaining models,  the inequitable share of income and resources, also reveal the 4
power relations that exist in a household. What we need to consider by studying these models, is 
that if theory becomes a way by which we come to see gender relations, then to what degree does 
theory inform policy measures, especially ones that affect the lives of women. This is especially 
true with how centrally the idea of fixed and individual preferences figures into the neoclassical 
household models. This chapter concludes with a feminist critique of the household models, 
which continues onto the following chapter.  
 which is prevalent the current mainstream literature empowerment, as a framework to understand economic 4
behavior (Duflo 2012). 
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Biological division of labour  
 In Gary Becker's unitary household model, one's gender, determines what one does in the 
household, and the market. His understanding of gender is in terms biological differences 
between men and women. Becker (1981) introduced the unitary household theory to model the 
behavior of families. At the core, it assumes that the way members in a family make decisions on 
shared things is by acting as if they are one, unitary household. This means that they all have the 
same preferences. There is one utility function for the household, and everyone cooperates in a 
way that maximizes the household's utility. Each individual specializes, and allocates their labour 
according to comparative advantage. It determines who stays at home and contributes to 
household labour, who participates in the labour market and earns an income, and how much 
members of the household invests in their human capital. Comparative advantage is determined 
by each of the member’s earnings potential and gender differences.   
 Comparative advantage made on biological lines also suggests that it is not possible to 
substitute men in the household instead of women. This means that men only have a comparative 
advantage in the market. But market wages are also lower for women, compared to men, 
 in part because they spend less time investing on the market capital, and invest more in 
household capital, therefore have greater productivity gains in the household compared to the 
market (p. 26). Especially during peak child rearing years for women, their time is worth more at 
home, than in the labour force (p. 27).  Though child bearing is a biological role, and rearing, or 5
motherhood, can arguably be socially constructed, the heavy biological commitment women 
 There is also a heteronormative bias in this model, because according to the specialization of labour idea along 5
gender lines, heterosexual households will also be more optimal and efficient than same sex households, because 
“households with only men or only women… are unable to profit from the sexual difference in comparative 
advantage” (Becker 1981 p. 23)
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make when they have children, which is an investment of their time and labour that could have 
been used elsewhere, gives them the incentive to make this investment worth it, whereas men, 
who do not invest into the child bearing, have less of an incentive to stay committed to the 
bearing process of children. Becker (1981) writes in his own words,  
   “most women have been reluctant to commit so much time, effort, emotion, and risk to 
producing children, without considerable control over rearing.” (p. 29) 
 He then points to evidence from developing and developed countries, that show labour 
force participation by mothers reduce the health of their children. Therefore, since such “sexual 
differences in specialized investments reinforce any biologically induced sexual division of 
labour,” women’s incentives to bearing children also reinforce their biological role of rearing. 
This means that it is hard to distinguish between biologically and environmentally determined 
divisions of labour between men and women (p. 23).    6
 If we were to treat power as an ability to make a choice, in this model, women have more 
power over men because they have a choice between household and market work.  Albelda et al. 
(2009) point out that if we were to “reverse” the pattern of specialization outlined by Becker, 
where men stayed at home doing household work while women specialized primarily in the 
market doing paid work,  then the household “would be worse off.” In Becker’s analysis, 
families are more efficient in this model when they allocate labour according to their biologically 
  Becker’s theory of the household decision making is the first to bring in gender into neoclassical models of labour 6
supply, because it treats the household as a production unit, and the amount of time a member allocates in the 
household for production, will also affect their decision to supply labour to the market. This is different from the 
previous labour supply models, which suggested that there is a trade off between paid labour and leisure. (King 
1999, p. 502) However, if income of the primary member of the household increases, then labour supply between 
family members is adjusted. The dependent, according to Becker’s idea of comparative advantage determined by 
sex, will usually be the wife in the household.  If the primary earner, the husband, sees a rise in their income, then 
the dependent will adjust to this increase, by cutting down their own working in either the market, or the household, 
and opt for more leisure. (Alderman et al. 1995; Pollak 2002).  
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determined comparative advantage (p. 72). Furthermore, by Becker’s reasoning, women simply 
have to give up less market wages to do household work while men have to give up more market 
wages to do household work, and are also far less productive at household work (Barker 1999, p. 
393).  At the end of the day, women actually have a “productive option outside of the labour 7
market” in the home, which is “not readily available to men” (Albelda et al. 2009, p. 73). 
Women’s empowerment cannot be understood through the unitary household model if we take 
power as an ability to make choices because by this definition of power women are more 
privileged in a unitary household.  
Problems with methodology  
 At the center of neoclassical analysis was the idea of methodological individualism, that 
an economy is comprised of a group of individual rational economic agents, who maximize their 
utility, given a constraint.  Pujol (1992) highlights that Becker’s household model tried to 
account for inconsistencies that the neoclassical model would have presented otherwise 
concerning families. Families are at odds with the neoclassical model, because if parents need to 
act altruistically and unselfishly towards their children, as they would need to when investing in 
their human capital, this contradicts assumption of self interests. But in Becker’s model, a 
household acts as a single rational agent, where income is pooled and an altruist cares for the 
wellbeing of the family, transferring purchasing power to each of the members of the household. 
Since the family has a unified set of interests, these transfers or the conditionality of the 
transfers, should then induce the other selfish, egoistic members of the households to align and 
 This is also how the gender pay gap is justified in neoclassical economics, women could work but they will chose 7
occupations that might not be high paying but are “compatible with her household responsibilities” (Barker 1999, p. 
393).
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match their interests with those of the altruist, benefactor of the household (the father or 
husband). (Woolley 1999, p.  328)  
 If households operate as one unit, then income and resources is pooled, and distributed 
optimally. Parents, or in particular the altruist (the one who provides income for others), must 
then behave in an altruistic way or display altruistic preferences. The altruists wants to maximize 
the collective happiness (or utility) of the household. The altruist’s utility maximizing function is 
a function of their own utility and the consumption function of the recipients, who unlike the 
benefactor (altruist), act in an egoistic way and their utility only depends on their own 
consumption. If the recipient, for example a child, is a “rotten child,” and tries to raise their own 
consumption at the expense of other members of the family, then the altruist can simply reduce 
the size of their transfers, so the recipient will never have the incentive in the first place to 
increase their consumption at the cost of others. In this way, the preferences of the altruist and 
preferences of the household come to match. (Alderman et al. 1995, p. 4)  
 Before Becker’s formulation of an altruistic household head, James Mill had justified 
disenfranchisement of women with the reasoning that they were politically represented by their 
"fathers, brothers, and husbands," and therefore did not need to vote themselves, and Paul 
Samuelson, argued that altruism and mutual affection made family act as one unit. (Folbre 2009, 
p. 297) This relationship, in Becker, is modeled both between parents and children, and husband 
and wife.  As Folbre (2009) points out, although the language in Becker’s writings is gender 
neutral, there is an inversion of the traditionally held connection between femininity and 
altruism, which provides connotations of caring, selflessness, and is usually associated as a 
motherly attribute. (p. 298) Barker (1999) suggests that the particular family that Becker invokes 
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in his model, though not explicitly implying that the household head is a man, still reflects a 
patriarchal, Victorian ideal. Folbre (1980) uses patriarchy to denote a system where father’s have 
power over their children, as well as their wives. In a broader sense, patriarchal societies 
reproduce sexual division of labour, sustain the concentration of women in lower paid and 
unpaid, reproductive work. (as cited in Matthaei 1999, p. 592) Becker’s model inadvertently 
reveals the patriarchal underpinnings of the neoclassical model, by highlighting the dependency 
of women on men.  
 Folbre (2009) also critiques the assumptions of efficiency that the unitary model is based 
on. Since decisions are made in the best interest of all the members of a household, the 
distribution of resources within the households is always efficient. In Becker's unitary household 
model, the rotten kid theorem explains how even the rotten, selfish kids, cannot act in an egoistic 
way, that would take away someone else’s utility to increase their own. Rosenzweig and Schultz 
(1982) find that in households in India, less food is allocated to females, because families depend 
more on the future expected incomes of their male children. Folbre draws out a paradox here, 
health and nutrition of the female members are sacrificed, there is a higher mortality of females 
compared to males, but for the sake of efficiency, which leaves the household better off because 
the distribution of resources is optimal in relation to the household as a whole. The same way 
government spending crowds out investment from the private sector, in the neoclassical model, 
making the effect of the spending redundant, if there is unanticipated increase in the resources 
available to one family member, then others would simply shift some of their own resources 
away from that member and neutralize the change. (p. 298)  
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 Becker  (1976) assumed that individuals are rational, there is information symmetry, so 
"individuals know what they want and can get away with what they want as long as they are free 
to choose". Folbre (2009) suggests that very "confidence" by which Becker makes this claim, in 
a way “justifies the gender inequality” that exist in the model, because it assumes that women 
themselves choose the jobs that pay less, because they feel more responsible than men to allocate 
their time outside of market work, towards family care, because they enjoy it more. For mothers 
especially, they get a higher utility out of the bearing of their children over fathers. The 
inequality in wages and at home is voluntary for the unitary household model.  
 Folbre (1986) also writes that the assumption that women and female children 
“voluntarily” relinquish leisure, education, and food” would only be plausible if “they were in a 
position to demand their fair share,” therefore by taking into “women’s lack of economic power” 
and “unequal allocation of household resources” into consideration “lends the bargaining power 
(collective model) approach much of its persuasive appeal” (p. 261, as cited in Alterman et al. 
1995, p. 5). 
 I have already mentioned above that the idea of a biologically determined comparative 
advantage, gives more power to women over men, which misses the actual reality of women's 
lives in households, and outside. Especially in the developing world, a free choice for paid 
market work may not be an option for women. The concept of empowering women cannot fully 
enter the unitary household model, because it does not address the gender inequality that persists 
in the intra household distribution of resources. In fact, inequities in distribution of income and 
resources (or even biologically determined division of labour) is justified because it is a product 
of rational, individual choices. Income and resources are pooled, and the distribution is always 
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Pareto-efficient, no one is left better off. It becomes impossible to empower an individual in the 
household exclusively, and increase their wellbeing. The only thing we can do about it, is 
empowering the household, where wellbeing of the household as a whole should increase. But 
the distribution of resources, even if it is inequitable, remains the same, because it represents the 
most efficient allocation. 
Bargaining households and individual preferences 
 The unitary model does not address the potential that distribution of resources among 
household members can be unequal. Thomas (1990), for example, finds that unearned income in 
control of the mother, which is outside of the control of the father (altruist) and has a greater 
positive effect on the health of the household than the income that is earned and controlled by the 
father. An alternative way of approaching household decision making is by assuming that 
individual members of households do not have the same preferences, and have to negotiate their 
difference in preferences. Intra-household bargaining models highlight that households reconcile 
with these difference in preferences by either “relying on non-cooperative relations” or by 
relying on “cooperative solutions” (Alderman et al. 1995, p. 5). The process, or game, which 
determines these outcomes is bargaining.  8
 Though the notion of power is not explicitly mentioned in this literature, power can be 
seen as the ability to bargain, and make decisions. Empowerment can be seen as the process 
through which women acquire the ability to bargain, or make decisions for themselves and 
others. We can use the bargaining models therefore, as a framework to conceptualize women’s 
empowerment. People's bargaining strengths, measuring their ability to bargain, is dependent on 
 Though the earlier bargaining models still hold on to the idea of matching preference and Pareto-efficiency, they 8
are dropped with succeeding models (Agarwal 1997).
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a “threat point” or a “fall back position.” (Pollak 2002, p. 28-29) The higher the fall back 
position, for example, the more resources one has to fall back on, and therefore the more one can 
bargain with. The fall back position is socially determined by factors outside of the household 
(Pollak 2002).  
 The first intra-household bargaining models are cooperative in nature and resemble 
unitary models. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), use a game theory 
scenario to show that household members will bargain over a pooled income. An individual’s 
bargaining ability is determined by their fall back positions, which is a function of outside 
options such as non-wage income, legal structure governing marriage, or parental wealth. They 
determine what the individual’s options would be outside of the household, the welfare they 
would receive, if they were to exit the household. (Doss 2013; Agarwal 1997)  
 Cooperative models share the reasoning with unitary models that sometimes it makes 
economic sense to come together and act as one unit. Unitary models are a particular type of 
cooperative models, where preferences of individuals are the same, and the income and resources 
are also pooled as a result (Quisumbing et al. 2000). Becker (1976) writes that marriage is 
voluntary, and only when the utility gained by marrying is higher than remaining single, do 
individuals marry. According to the theory of household production, the utility gained by 
activities such as  “companionship, love, and health status” (p. 206) from marriage, can be higher 
and induce members to rely on cooperation.  In the absence of perfect substitution for men and 
women between labour market and home production, men and women gain from marriage 
because as single people, “they cannot produce equivalents of the optimal combination of inputs 
achieved by married couples” (Becker 1976, p. 210). In a cooperative household too, a 
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household comes into being, when the opportunity cost of forming a household is low, or where 
there are more benefits of being in a union with someone or living inside a household unit. The 
cooperative models differ from unitary models in terms of distribution of resources, and it is 
power differentials between members, that determine the distribution of resources. In contrast to 
Becker’s altruistic model, each partner has a utility function that is based on their own 
consumption, and not partly on the partner’s. This means they also have different preferences. In 
essence, members will bargain over the allocation of pooled resources and income, and a optimal 
outcome will be determined by their bargaining ability. (Quisumbing et al. 2000) 
 But the significance of these models is that if members are not able to reconcile with their 
differences (in preferences), then they have to settle for a lower utility level, which is represented 
by their individual fall back position or threat point (Pollak 2002, p. 28). This default point, is in 
a sense, what determines the bargaining power of each members of the household. Therefore, 
any policy measure to increase the bargaining power of women, and in this model, will have to 
be targeted at raising this default point. Divorce can represent this threat point if cooperation 
were to fail. Expenditure patterns will be conditional on who receives or controls income after a 
divorce, who is better off if they were to exit the household (29). But divorce is a legal institution 
which exists outside of the household. A threat point, essentially is a function of conditions 
outside of the household, such as alimony and child support laws, the ability for a woman to 
return to their natal home after a divorce, or restrictions they face to enter the labour force 
(Alderman, p. 6).  For example, if we suppose men are the primary earners in the household and 
will retain more income after a divorce, and if there is no availability of welfare programs to 
divorce or child support obligations for men and women (Pollak 2002, p. 7). We also suppose 
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that women usually do not have the option of returning to their natal homes because divorces are 
seen as a social stigma. Based on these conditions, we can argue that men have a greater exit 
option, more resources to fall back on (or poses a greater threat to exit the household), than 
women, and therefore will also have a greater bargaining ability or power.     
 But in the context of developing countries, it is problematic to use divorce as a threat 
point or make the assumption that there is a voluntary choice of marriage. It is possible, and 
especially for women, that they might not have a choice of forming a household and then opting 
to divorce, if the cooperation failed. Society’s view towards unmarried people, might also be a 
reason to get married, and this is not motivated by any economic factors. Lastly, it is unrealistic 
that either households exist in cooperation, or fall apart. (Pollak 2002; Sen 1999) 
 Lundberg and Pollak (1993) argue that a threat point can also be representative of a non-
cooperative equilibrium with in a marriage, because it is not always an option or “plausible” to 
use divorce as a threat if cooperation were to fail. In many cultures, divorce is also not legally 
“possible” or socially encouraged. Expenditure pattern, and the intra household distribution of 
resources, will instead depend on who “receives or has control over income within marriage,” 
rather than after divorce.  This theory of “separate spheres” suggests that household members do 
not always cooperate, they can live in their separate non-cooperative spheres but still find 
advantage in some joint form of consumption, production and activities, which they bargain over. 
For example, there are “household public goods,” where both the husband and wife can 
participate and derive utility out of. By supplying their individual time, income, and labour to 
take care of their children, they don't exclude the other from deriving utility out of this, because 
both of them value the well being of their children. At other times, they remain in the household 
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and operate in separate spheres, where “gender and social norms,” determine the division of 
labour, “assign the primary responsibility of some activities to husbands and others to wives.” 
The fact that women are more commonly expected to be the primary care givers for children is 
reflective of social and gender norms, “rather than preferences or productivity differences 
between a husband and wife,” as entailed in the cooperative and unitary household models. (As 
cited in Pollak 2002, p. 29)  
 The non-cooperative models, by turning into gender and social norms about division of 
labour, bring in social norms into the economics of the family.  
Social norms in bargaining household models 
 While the unitary household model placed the household in relation to an abstract market, 
the succeeding bargaining models try and place the household in a wider society by bringing in 
the influence of norms and institutions. However, norms are given and exogenous to the process 
of bargaining (Agarwal 1997).  
 Bakker (1999) directs us to the influence that institutional economics in some strands of 
neoclassical analysis. Institutional economics gives importance to "norms, cultures, and values" 
in economic processes. Institutionalist argue, “patterns of behavior and perceptions,”  are 
something that is culturally shared and specific, so that means that markets, rational choice, 
preferences in work and consumption  are not a product of “individual “taste and preferences,” 
but of cultural patterns and social norms (p. 480). This line of thought echoes strongly 
throughout feminist critiques of the household model and will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 Shultz (1995) draws a similar comparison with the work of Esther Boserup, who he 
writes, underlined the "limitations of development for the advancement of women," in cases 
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where institutions and culture resist change. He categorizes Boserup (1970) to the tradition 
within economics that studies the "constraints that social institutions and culture" put for women 
to achieve as much as men, or acquire as much human capital. (p. 5) Schultz (1995) argues that 
by looking at gender inequality through the lens of the neoclassical household models, where it 
assumes the household behaves in an efficient way given it is subject to constrained endowments 
and market opportunities, leaves out important cultural and social aspects that might shed light 
on the problem. 
 In the development economics literature, Boserup (1970) challenges the view that 
economic growth, modernization, and capital accumulation necessarily benefits women. In the 
case of modernization of agriculture, women receive less access to resources, such as training, 
land rights, and education. This is partly because of the colonial and post-colonial impressions of 
women as being unproductive in agriculture, and not solely from a sexual division of labour. As a 
result, men end up investing more human capital and are productive in agriculture. In terms of 
industrial modernization, women have a disadvantage in combining work in the modern, market 
sector with their reproductive responsibilities at home. Women, and especially older women, also 
lack the modern professional skills and education to participate outside. (as cited in Shultz 1995, 
p. 51-60) Boserup's (1970) remedy was therefore to invest more in better education and training 
of women, challenge perceptions of them as simply housewives, and train them to compete with 
men in the market place. (as cited in Elson 1999, p. 100)   
 By participating in the market, women can challenge social norms about what women can 
and are allowed to do, and increase their bargaining ability in the household. However, Kabeer 
and Humphrey (1993) highlight that in Boserup (1970), women’s ability to bargain for a greater 
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access to resources, is still linked to their participation of the market first, which then will bring 
out social change. (as cited in Bakker 1999, p. 484) 
 Although the strength of people’s bargaining ability is socially determined, the fact that it 
is still contingent on who is better off when the marriage breaks, or who receives or controls the 
money within the marriage, means that social norms only have an affect on fall back positions 
through the labour market. A women’s ability to bargain, is contingent on her earning’s potential 
outside of the household, in the market. Here, social norms only have an instrumental role to 
play, but expansion of the bargaining household (Sen 1990; Agarwal 1997) show that social 
norms interfere directly with the household.  Social norms can be "endogenous" to the bargaining 
process (Agarwal 1997, p. 15). In a sense, social norms carry their own set of preferences, that 
are contested with the preferences of individuals in the household. Part of the bargaining process 
is to negotiate between the preferences of the self and the society’s. This is a subject of concern 
in the following two chapters.  
The problem with individual preferences 
 The rest of this chapter is devoted to the key assumption of intra-household bargaining 
models of fixed, individual preferences. The bargaining household models, though departing 
from the assumptions of Pareto-efficiency, income pooling, and uniform preferences, takes 
preferences to be outside of the model, and is concerned only with the dimension of choices, 
prices and costs. There are two people in the intra household bargaining model who have their 
own individual preferences, are guided by self interests, to cooperate, or not cooperate. How 
much the outcomes favors our preferences depends on our relative bargaining strengths. 
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 This rationale comes from neoclassical economics, where individual preferences and 
taste give context to people's choices, and describe the historical and social attitudes that the 
person embodies. In neoclassical economics, we think in terms of rational choice, given a 
constraint of some sort. Rational choice suggests that individuals are able to order their 
preferences, the things they like and dislike, and then proceed to make choices that will 
maximize their self interest. So an individual, as a rational agent, will be able to rank between 
different consumption bundles according to their preference, and chooses the bundle with the 
highest ranking. It is also assumed, that they are capable of expressing their preference between 
any pair of consumption bundle. The fact that there is a given constraint, means that preferences 
are independent of the constraints placed on choice, prices, and other costs, and so people will 
maximize their utility or wellbeing, by taking part in an economic activity where their marginal 
benefit is equal to the marginal cost. (Barker 1999, p. 571)  
 The bargaining process is concerned with the constraints facing a household, in terms 
choices, prices, and cost. For example, a woman's threat-point, which is a measure of her 
bargaining strength, is the cost borne to a woman versus her husband, if the marriage were to 
break. A fall back position, is representative of how much control an individual has of income 
and resources, relative to their partner, within a marriage. (Alderman et al. 1995; Pollak 2002) So 
to increase one's bargaining strength, through increasing a woman's threat point, is to lessen the 
cost borne by them, if the marriage were to break. This might be done by increasing women's 
opportunities outside of the household, through waged work, and making them more financially 
independent, either through employment or access to land or monetary resources such as loans 
(Sen 1999, p. 202). Women will subsequently be able to make choices that are more in line to 
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their individual preferences.  Their lived experiences, their beliefs and attitudes, and self 
perceptions, are reflected in their tastes and preferences.  
 A challenge within economics, to individual and exogenous preferences, comes from 
political economists. A political economy view, put forward by Marxists, Keynesians, and 
Institutionalist,  argues that “behavior is not always individual but social” as well, and people are 
“not just rational, calculating individuals” (Albelda et al. 2009, p. 121-122). In neoclassical 
analysis, preferences and tastes are not only individual, but are also exogenous and outside of the 
scope of  concern of the "economist's world." But to a political economist, "context is 
everything" and "outside influences are the most important determinant of what people want to 
purchase," and therefore of economic transactions. The political economy model, makes 
preferences endogenous, as well as the object of their study. (p. 124) The "political" enters this 
framework because political economists treat economic agents as both individuals and members 
of social groups (based on race, gender, class), and view “important social groups in our society 
as being related to each other by unequal power and uneven access to resources” (p. 122). This 
latter point is recognized in the intra household bargaining models to some extent.  “Gender 
relations,” which are relations of power between men and women, are revealed in both the 
division of labour and resources between men and women, as well as the “ideas and 
representations” ascribed to each gender (Agarwal 1997, p.1). In the cooperative, intra household 
models, the cooperative outcomes from the bargaining process, can show us the inequities 
between men and women, in terms of "who does what, who gets what goods and services, and 
how each member is treated." Even if the cooperative outcomes are better off than non 
cooperative outcomes, they can still can favor one part over the other. Increasing the bargaining 
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strengths of an individual member of the household, pushes the outcomes to favor that member 
over others.  In later, non cooperative models, the household members are in "separate spheres," 
and cooperate over some joint consumption or production, such as rearing children, while at 
other times withdraw in to separate, non-cooperative spheres, which is based on division of 
labour based on socially recognized gender roles, outside of the bargaining process (p. 5).  
 For Agarwal (1997), while the intra household bargaining models, address some of these 
gender sysmetries and relations of power, in the examples provided above, it says little about the 
role of "social norms and perceptions," the "effect of the gender differences that exists in the 
exercise of self interest," and the gender relations outside of the household. (p. 2) This is more in 
light of the political economist view, that while the bargaining models,  relflect some aspects of 
the power dynamics that exist between men and women, it takes individual preferences as 
entirely given, and is only concerned with choices, prices, and costs. 
 On this issue, Agarwal poses the question of what if some “household members do not 
act in their own interest” and as a result, “do not bargain in their best advantage?”  This concern 
with individual preferences is one of the main critiques to emerge out of the intra household 
bargaining model. Sen (1990) suggests that the shortfall of the bargaining models is the 
assumption of “individual preferences,” that we are able to chose or have greater liking for one 
alternative over others. But for Sen, what the bargaining models do not take into account is the 
“formation of beliefs and preferences under the influence of social norms and social experiences 
in general.” (As cited in Peter, p. 21) So the problem with the bargaining models, in the context 
of gender divisions, “arise not so much from the nature of any particular solution,” suggesting 
that he does see value in using the bargaining models to explain gender divisions, but rather 
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“from the formulation of the problem itself,” where individual preferences, rational choice, and 
self interest form the 'problem' or the basis of intra household bargaining. (Sen 1990, p 133) The 
bargaining models bring in the possibility of differing preferences and interests, which is why 
they need to negotiate and bargain. But it does not considered how people end up with different 
preferences.  
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Chapter 2: Feminist critiques of the neoclassical household models and feminist notions of 
empowerment 
 In the intra-household bargaining models, people came in with their predetermined set of 
preferences. Preferences are individual and exogenous to the model. But if our preferences, 
interests, or desires help define what we want and need, and ultimately guide us to make valuable 
choices, the weakness of the bargaining household models, lies in the fact that it does not 
consider the ways individual preferences are formed. Preferences are seldom individual. Our 
preferences are formed from our self perceptions and beliefs, social norms, and our day to day 
lived experiences. If our self perceptions and beliefs are false, misguided, or inadequate, then this 
undermines our agency, our ability to define our goals and aspirations, and therefore our ability 
to make meaningful choices, and bargain for an equitable share of resources.  9
 However, the language of false perceptions does not adequately capture the full picture. If 
perceptions were false, policy intervention should be at the level of an individual. Sen (1990) 
suggests that our perceptions are formed by “social norms and social experiences” (as cited in 
Peter 2005, p. 21). Therefore, I move to the idea that there are alternative, fluid realities, from the 
ones we live in (Bourdieu 1977; Agarwal 1997; Kabeer 1999). Women are constrained by certain 
social realities which appear fixed and unchangeable, but in reality, can be contested and 
bargained over (Agarwal 1994; Kabeer 1997, Bourdieu 1970). Social norms and beliefs are 
changeable. Likewise, preferences of women, and of others of women (in terms of expected 
 In line with prevailing ideas of power in feminist literature, that power comes from the ability to make strategic 9
and meaningful choices (Kabeer 1999), or control over material assets and intellectual resources (Batliwala 1997). 
Agency, is defined by Kabeer (1999), as the ability to define and act on one's goals and aspirations, and in Sen 
(1999), agency is the freedom to chose the type of lives we have to value. 
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roles), are also changeable and “endogenous” (Stern 2005, p. 244). Policy intervention should 
also be aimed at the level of the community, with the objective of changing social norms and 
preferences, because this is the level at which norms operate (Agarwal 1997).  
False perceptions and individual welfare 
 Individuals are social beings, therefore the way to empower an individual is to understand 
their relationship with the society that they are in, and how it affects them positively and 
negatively. Sen (1990) suggests that individuals must be socially removed or dis-embedded from 
their social reality, if they are to truly carry individual preferences. But if we are to accept that 
individuals are social beings, are a part of a family or a community, then the idea that their 
preferences are strictly individual loses ground. His idea of a "perceived interest response" 
suggests that individuals can have a false perception of their interests. In this case, individuals 
cannot accurately assess how they are faring either. (p. 127) 
 Like the above mentioned political economists, Sen (1990) also argues that economic 
agents have “many identities,” such as being a man or a woman, or being a member of a family 
and community. Therefore, if our “individuality” is compromised of many different identities, 
and we are constantly implicated in the relations in our families and those outside of it, then our 
understanding of our “interests, wellbeing, objectives… and legitimate behavior” is subject to the 
“various and conflicting effects of these diverse identities.”  When we come to conceptualize 10
individuals as social beings, we can no longer ignore the “strong influence” of “families,” and 
 This way of understanding an individual, shares parallel to contemporary feminist writers, such as Butler (2009). 10
Through the idea of “precarity,” Butler (2009) suggests that we’re all embodied creatures, and there’s a lived 
experience of having a body that we all share, which necessitates social relations. Since birth, individuals come 
together to give care because “a living being may die” and only under conditionality that “the loss of what would 
matter does the value of life appear” (p. 14). She is suggesting that we don't even come to exists if not for the social 
support around us, and a body, that is not social, cannot exist. 
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our societies, on our perception in ways that we can not “formulate any clear notion of our own 
individual welfare,” our perception of what is good for us, can be subject to influences of others 
on us.  (p. 126) 11
 The issue with using using individual preferences, is that it is a "subjective" measure of 
our wellbeing.  In the bargaining models, two parties come with their own set of preferences, or 12
in Sen’s words, “clearly perceived interests,” (132) for a desired level of wellbeing or “welfare,” 
and they try to negotiate an outcome, which is dependent on their bargaining strengths. The 
“utilitarian tradition,” treats our “mental states as reflections of individual wellbeing,” using the 
“metrics of happiness and desire,” (Sen 1990, p 127). In summarizing Sen (1990), Beneria 
(2009)  writes that "inadequate perceptions" and "false consciousness" can lead to a “weak 
understanding of personal wellbeing,” because these subjective elements is shaped by “norms, 
perceptions of self and others, and ability to articulate personal needs” (p. 212). This is especially 
true for “deprived groups,” such as women and minorities, who may be “habituated to 
inequality,” are “unaware of possibilities of social change,” or are “willing to accept the 
legitimacy of the established order,” (Sen 1990, p. 127). What Sen (1990) is proposing, is that 
since an individual cannot have a clear understanding of themselves, and so method to measure 
 However, we can know what is good for us, such as women may be aware that they can do certain things that will 11
be good for them, but what we know is good for us might not socially accepted. This is discussed in more detail by 
Agarwal (1997) in the following subsection, when Agarwal argues against this notion of women being driven by 
false perceptions. Instead women may have a clear idea of their interests, but they need to negotiate it with the 
society's interests. 
 The second issue is to do with the model is being confided to “individual interests" alone, without including the 12
effects of other variables such as contribution. Sen (1990) describes this phenomena as the perceived contribution 
response, "[if] a person was perceived as making a larger contribution to the overall opulence of the group, then the 
collusive solution, if different, would be more favorable to that person" (p. 136).  Women’s contributions, relative to 
men, might be undervalued (Agarwal 1997), and this idea is similar to the studies in developed countries, for 
example England and Killborune (2010), where they study the “cultural devaluation” of household work, where they 
find women who earn cash, over housewives, have a greater bargaining ability [find a better example] (as cited in 
Agarwal). 
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our wellbeing should not then be centered around the individual’s “perceived interests” or 
preferences. He writes, there is a need to “distinguish between the perception of interest and 
some more objective notions of their respective wellbeing,” meaning we need a more "objective" 
way of measuring wellbeing. (p. 133) 
  For example, if people are undernourished,  it does not make sense to wait to assess how 
an individual feels about their state of wellbeing (let alone that they are even aware of their 
undernourishment),  but instead, undernourishment calls for some standard of measuring how 
that person is faring, which can be used at once, and has a detached aspect. Therefore Sen (1990) 
urges us towards using capabilities. A person is undernourished, because they are denied certain 
capabilities, such as the "ability to be nourished.” (p. 127) 
 We can imagine aspects to women's empowerment in a similar way. Individuals might 
not have a clear understanding of themselves, which means that they will not always know what 
is best for them. Sen (1990) writes that this sort of misunderstanding, when people are driven by 
these false mental states, reinforces and keeps in place inequitable power structures, such as 
gender inequality (p. 126).  Perceptions can be shaped by what others think of us, our ability, our 
needs, and our worth. By this reasoning, women are not fully able to perceive their self interests, 
partly because of how other people, in their family, or community, perceive them, and box them 
within constructed gender roles. But if women already have a false perception of their self 
interests, then they come into the bargaining process asking or bargaining for less, which 
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legitimizes other people's expectations of their needs as being lesser.  Sen (1990), describes this 13
bias in perception, towards favoring other members of the family, as the "perceived interest 
response,"  
 "given other things, if the self interest perception of the persons were to attach less value 
to his or her own well being, then the collusive solution, if different would be less favorable to 
that person, in terms of well being" (p. 136). 
  Agarwal (1997) both expands and argues against this notion of a “false 
consciousness,” (p. 23) highlighting that while women can sometimes settle for less than they 
would have liked to bargain for, this might not arise from selflessness but a limitedness of their 
options to chose from, to begin with (p. 24). Sometimes, if women are more dependent on family 
support, and can derive utility from this children, their concern for the family’s wellbeing over 
theirs might still be “consistent with self interest” (Seiz 1999, p. 384). Agarwal (1997) suggests 
that being altruistic can still imply having self awareness. She give’s examples (Sharma 1980, 
Kishwar 1982, Lindholm 1982), of many instances which challenge the idea of women in South 
Asia suffering from false perceptions, and accepting the “legitimacy of intra household 
inequality.” The outward “appearance of compliance,” also does not mean that women are not 
able to perceive their best interests, but can “reflect a survival strategy stemming from the 
constraints on their ability” to act “overtly” or bargain openly about for those interests (p. 24). 
 If a woman’s role in the household consists solely of cooking and taking care of her children, then “inaccurate 13
perceptions” (Agarwal 1997, p. 11) about her needs undervalue her contributions relative to wage labour of her 
husband Agarwal (1994) highlights that women’s needs can be conflated with the “family’s needs,” and Sen (1990) 
and England and Kilbourne (1990), argue that while men may be driven by self interests, and have a much clearer 
sense of self interests, women may see theirs as being absorbed into the welfare of the households, or are more 
socialized into becoming more caring, selfless, and are less likely to bargain for their own set of preferences (as 
cited in Seiz 1999, p. 384). The family can undervalue the needs of a woman. And the outcome of a bargaining 
process will be less favorable to someone if they attach less value to their own well being relative to others.
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Chen (1983), and Kabeer (1997) also give examples of women opting “private forms of 
empowerment,” which retains a “public image, and honor, of the traditional decision-maker,” but 
in their private lives, have “backstage influence in decision making.” (as cited in Kabeer 1999, p. 
448) 
Social norms 
 I started the criticism of the bargaining models with the idea of false perceptions. But it is 
important to look into why are perceptions false and on what basis are they false. And finally, 
how do these false perceptions come about? Perceptions come about through social norms and 
deeply held beliefs.  While women’s perceptions can be shaped by norms, norms by itself is 14
shaped by lived realities, which are not fixed, and are therefore changeable (Agarwal 1997).  
 Kabeer (1999) and Agarwal (1997) argue that perceptions are not false, or incorrect, 
because the way we form our preferences, what we need or desire, is shaped by the context of 
our day to day lives, which is the product of our "individual histories," and our material and 
social realities (Kabeer, p. 441). And essentially, Kabeer (1999) and Agarwal (1997) argue that 
we cannot call our lived experiences false, because they are lived and therefore real. Kabeer 
(1999) also highlights that our perceptions and beliefs are shaped by a "deeper level of reality," 
such as social norms and traditions (p. 441). Agarwal (1997) sees this as "external constraints" 
that is "acting overtly [against women's] self interests," which can be contested and bargained 
over, as social norms are endogenous to the bargaining process (p. 25).   
 At the same time, perceptions of individuals can also shape social norms. Perceptions of others over time, from 14
reiteration and repetition, can take on fixed meanings, and come across as natural and established (Butler 2009). 
Agarwal (1997) talks of how inadequate perceptions about women's productivity and contribution can get 
“institutionalized” as a norm, by systematically paying lower wages to women over men. This is one of the ways in 
which perceptions influence social norms, but it is important to see them as distinct from social norms, as 
perceptions can affect bargaining ability by itself. (p. 12) 
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 Before I talk in more depth about these "deeper level of realities" that help form women's 
preferences, I would like to emphasize that while these authors argue against Sen's (1990) 
placing of importance in women's false or incorrect perceptions, the differences between Sen 
(1990) and these authors seem mostly to be a difference of language. Sen (1990) also writes that 
preferences are formed from deeply held beliefs, norms, as well as people’s everyday lived 
realities. While it is true that our perceptions in a sense cannot be false, because it is based on 
lived realities, it is also true that maybe this is a lived reality that we want to change. After all, 
gender empowerment has been central in international development projects. What would we 
think of development as if it does not provide a space for us to imagine a better future, or lead us 
to somewhere we ought to be. Of course, someone has to take a normative position about where 
we ‘ought to be,’ and what is considered a ‘better place,’ which can be problematic. This is one 
of the main tensions that arise when reading Stern et al. (2005) in the next chapter. The tension, 
or even a confusion, is over whether Stern et al. (2005) actually feel that preferences must be 
changed and that the current set of preferences of the people they want to empower are wrong. 
But addresses this issue, saying that his intention is not to "engineer" an ideal set of preferences 
for anyone (p. 262). But their intention is to create spaces in which individuals have a chance to 
reform their preferences, and similarly where norms can also be challenged and changed. Stern et 
al. (2005) write more specifically,  
 “Trying to analyze and tackle the problems of policy in the context of changing 
preferences in this way is not about trying to engineer preferences. Instead, it is about social 
processes that empower people to actively participate, so that along the way they will transform 
their own identities, preferences, and beliefs.” (p. 262) 
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  In the case of gender empowerment, Stern et al. (2005) would suggest that women should 
be in these spaces, making a normative assessment themselves of where they ought to be. I will 
talk about this in greater detail in next chapter. For the moment, changing social norms or 
“endogeneity of social norms" is also central to Agarwal’s (1997) argument to increasing 
women's bargaining ability (p. 37). 
 Kabeer (1999) highlights that preferences can be a product of a "deeper level of reality" 
which is not visible and apparent "in daily life because it is inscribed in the taken for granted 
rules, norms and customs within which everyday life is conducted" (p. 411). The way a "deeper 
level of reality" shapes our preferences, can be understood by Bourdieu's (1977)  theory of 
"doxa" (p. 159). "Doxa"  is the attributes of a culture and tradition, that is accepted as natural and 
is not open to question or contestation (as cited in Kabeer 1999; and Agarwal 1997). We move 
away from the static state of "doxa," when we have a alternative ways of "being and doing" as 
"material and cultural possibilities," so what was previously passed off as natural, will start to 
loose this fixed character, and will "reveal the underlying arbitrariness of the given social 
order" (Kabeer 1999, p 141).  
 Another way to understand this is through Butler's (2009) idea of framing. Butler (2009) 
highlights that certain political events are framed in a particular way, which frames our response 
to it, while certain things outside of the frame is left unthinkable, such as the lives lost of enemy 
civilians in war that are not framed as valuable by its opposition side. Therefore we (in the 
opposition) cannot grieve those lives in the same way. When we come to realize we are 
desensitized towards those lives, it leads us question what we view as normal or grievable lives, 
and what leads us to think think that are normal. This realization and the questioning that ensues 
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challenges the frames that have shaped the world in a particular way for us. So when we see how 
certain things are framed to pass off as natural, then in this realization, there is also a potential to 
change how we frame them. 
 Agarwal (1997) argues that in the bargaining household models, norms are exogenous,  15
but in actuality, norms can be bargained over, and we can create new social realities in this way. 
She suggests that gender relations should not only be conceptualized in terms of division of 
labour, or access to resources, but also in how certain "ideas and representations" are ascribed to 
men and women. (p. 1) Agarwal (1997) argues that norms are not unchangeable, but in fact, they 
themselves may be "subject to bargaining and change.” Certain constructions of women’s roles 
and behavior in society, are not fixed or “indisputable,” but may have come out of “past 
ideological struggles” and bargaining processes. To take norms, that have been “taken for 
granted” into an space for  “contestation,” itself requires bargaining. However, it has the 
potential of gaining, for example, acceptance to inequities that women suffer as not being 
"biologically rooted," but as "cultural constructions.” (Agarwal 1997, p. 19) 
 The bargaining outcomes of these new social realities, which represent that social norms 
have changed, depends on economic factors, the role of collective action, and women's ability to 
bargain outside of the household, in the community, and in policy making. While the intra-
household bargaining models implicitly place women within the households, women's ability to 
 Agarwal (1997) argues that norms interfere with the household bargaining process both exogenously and 15
endogenously. Social norms, exogenously, can affect the outcomes of the bargaining process, by "setting limits" to 
what can be bargained for, what sort of behavior is "legitimate," and the restrictions placed on the bargaining can 
affect a women’s bargaining power in the household. Norms are also manifested in “certain cultural constrains of 
appropriate female behavior” which in turn affects how the bargaining process in conducted. In these examples, 
norms affect the bargaining process, and its final outcome, such as the wellbeing of its members, but in a sense, are 
outside of the household bargaining process, they are exogenous. (p. 15-17)
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bargain outside of the household is crucial, because it is at this level that social norms are formed 
and can be negotiated.  (p. 27)  16
 The "recognition" that women are motivated with self interests, as are men, and both can 
be motivated by altruism and self interests, shifts our attention to the more “material constraints 
that shape women’s behavior” (Agarwal 1997, p. 27) and “ability to make choices” (Kabeer 
1999, p. 436) they value. As for policy making and grassroots interventions, rather than trying to 
find solutions in raising “women’s awareness of what constitutes their well being,” Agarwal 
(1997) suggests that more attention should be focused towards “strengthening women’s fall back 
positions, so they become less economically and socially dependent on sons, husbands, 
brothers.” (p. 27) Therefore she emphasizes the need to look at ways in which social norms 
interact endogenously and exogenously with the household, and determine people’s fall back 
positions. Agarwal moves away from the language of “false conciseness” because they suggested 
that women do not have clear notion of their self interests. She argues more likely the case that 
women do have clearly perceived interests, but they are constrained from making choices, in line 
with their self interests, because of social norms. So by changing social norms, women can reach 
closer to making decisions along their self interests.  
 However, it must be noted that Agarwal (1997) is still arguing within the frame work of 
the intra household bargaining models, where the constraints that determine a woman’s 
bargaining ability are still in a sense external  to her. Constraints can also be imagined, or can 17
 In Agarwal’s (1997) own words, “for ideas and practices to become norms, they require acceptance outside of the 16
household.” In the labour market, we can bargain for “wages.” In the work spaces, women's bargaining power can 
be shaped not only by "gender gaps in skills and education" but also social perceptions of their "domestic 
responsibilities" as women. Individuals can also be in a cooperative conflict with the community, like in the 
household, over sharing common resources such as "water source… positions of political power" or over norms set 
by the communities that "dictate social [appropriate] behavior." (p. 28-30)
 I am alluding to Stern et al.’s (2005) idea of external constraints.17
!38
exist in a “discursive” level as Kabeer (1999) highlights (p. 441).  Of course,  when Agarwal 18
(1997) suggests that social norms about gender roles or what is appropriate behavior for women 
can be changed, it would also mean that women can imagine new possibilities for themselves. 
But since Agarwal (1997) concludes with an emphasis on “material constraints,” it is important 
to make this further clarification. Changing social norms is not only changing a woman’s 
material surroundings, but it is also working through how she can now imagine herself. Kabeer 
(1999) suggests that we negotiate with social norms, as we try and move away from a static state 
of "doxa" to a state of "critical consciousness," when we have an alternative ways of "being and 
doing" as  "material and cultural possibilities." (p. 441) So the choices that women feel that they 
have, should also exist in a discursive level, as the section below explains. We can change a 
woman's material conditions, and increase her bargaining strength, but it may not enough, if she 
still doesn't perceive herself as being able to bargain for a greater share.  
Power, choices, and preferences 
 When we introduce the idea of preference formation to the discussion of empowerment, it 
complicates our understanding of power and the ability to make choices (Kabeer 1999). The 
problem is no longer that women are disempowered because they are making the wrong choices, 
choices that are not in line with their preferences. But it is the contrary, they are disempowered 
because their preferences do not lead them to make the best choices for themselves. As Kabeer 
(1999) explains,  
 "the possibility that power operates not only through constrains on people's ability 
to make choices, but also through their preferences and values and hence the choices that 
 Discursive choices or alternatives would mean choices and alternatives that can be imagined. Rokheya Hossain. 18
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they make, appears to pose a serious challenge to the basic equation made in this paper 
between power and choice." (p. 442) 
 If power also operates through people’s preferences, which is constitutive of their ideas 
and beliefs, then Kabeer (1999) writes that, we can only "retain" the relationship between 
“power” and “choices” by “extending the idea of [material] alternatives to encompass discursive 
alternatives.” (p. 442) Another way to phrase this would be, power is not just having an ability to 
choose between an alternative set of choices that are “material” (or physically there), but it is 
also having choices in a “discursive” sense (we can imagine that they are there).  If women are 
implicated in an inequitable power structure, the choices that they make can be a reflection of 
their individual preferences, but power here cannot derive from their ability to make choices. We 
need to address their preferences, because those women may be in a state of “doxa," where they 
do not question the inequities that blight their lives (p. 441). But to move towards "critical 
consciousness," when women are aware and critically think about their social order, rather than 
accepting it, Kabeer highlights that there needs to be an availability of "discursive alternatives" 
as well as material ones. Similarly, we judge an achievement outcome, such as whether a policy 
outcome could be taken as having empowered a woman and taken her out of the state of "doxa," 
not by just by asking whether "other choices were not only materially possible but whether they 
were conceived to be within the realms of possibility," or in other words, whether those choices 
could have been imagined as being possible.  (p. 442) In another article, Kabeer (2005) writes,  
 “Alternatives must not only exist, they must also be seen to exist. Power relations are 
most effective when they are not perceived as such. Gender often operates through unquestioned 
acceptance of power. Thus women, who for example internalize their lesser claim on household 
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resources, or accept violence at the hands of their husbands, do so because to behave otherwise is 
considered outside the realm of possibility. These forms of behavior could be said to reflect 
‘choice’, but are really based on denial of choice.” (p. 14) 
 This idea thinking is in line with the capability approach, where what matters is not 
necessarily what we chose, the outcome, but also what we could’ve chosen otherwise. If a 
woman is choosing to stay at home, then we evaluate this outcome based on what other choices 
she had. These choices are both material and discursive, the latter reflects a women’s ability to 
imagine that such a choice to be viable in their current reality. This woman may have come from 
a wealthy household, was educated, and could have sought work. She has that choice to work in 
a material sense because of the opportunities that her education degree has opened for her. But 
we should also ask, was she able to confidently see herself in a role other than that of a 
housewife? Even though she has obtained education, social boundaries can inhibit her from 
actually feeling like she can make something out of her education.  I use another example from 19
 Kabeer (2005) talks about the limitations of education as a channel to women’s empowerment, by giving several 19
examples from the developing world. An education degree can be seen as “equipping girls to be better wives… or 
increasing their chances of getting a suitable husband.” There has been an evident “gender bias” among teachers in 
parts of rural India, who give “more attention to boys and have lower opinion of girl’s abilities.” Lastly, curriculums 
have also been found to carry and “mirror… wider social inequities,” where girls are stereotypically presented as 
“passive, modest, and shy.” This has a powerful effect of “legitimizing” and “reinforcing traditional gender 
roles.”  (p. 17)
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the experiences of a successful HIV-AIDs intervention program in a red-light district in India, to 
illustrate this point further.  20
Feminist concepts of empowerment  
 The idea of discursive alternatives and acquiring the ability to envision between different 
possibilities for oneself is central to the early feminist concepts of empowerment. Baltiwala 
(1994) traces the idea of women's empowerment to popular education, where empowerment was 
essentially a process of learning "about one’s own oppression… [by] first becoming aware of the 
ideology that legitimizes male domination.” (as cited in Esplen et al. 2006, p. 3) Learning about 
how one is implicated in an unequal power relation is important in understanding oneself and 
building one’s consciousness. Building one's sense of consciousness, could also be seen as a way 
towards moving away from a state of "doxa" (Bourdieu 1977, p. 159) towards a state of "critical 
consciousness" (Kabeer 1999, p. 441).  But the feminist popular education agenda went beyond 
building self awareness of women, but also towards mobilizing “the poor to struggle actively for 
change” (Batliwala 1994, p. 128). The goals of feminist popular education were defined in the 
following way, 
 For example, Rao and Walton (2004) talk about how a red-light district in Kolkata saw a large improvement in the 20
rates of HIV infection because the policy intervention tried to work with the sex workers, and make them see a 
different role to themselves and the impact they could have on their peers’ lives as well. Sex-work is socially 
stigmatized in Indian society, and previous efforts had tried to steer sex-workers away from their work, which in 
turn, alienated them further from the rest of society.  It dehumanized their livelihoods. However, in a new 
intervention, health workers went in and "began treating sex workers with respect, as individuals who went about 
the ordinary business of life." After building a long relationship with them, starting with providing just basic health 
services, they gradually trained sex workers themselves to "pass on information to their co-workers” about HIV 
prevention. This method proved to be a lot more successful. The authors conclude saying, "this process of educating 
the sex workers... led, over a period of two or three years, to a metamorphosis in the sex worker's aspirations." It 
gave them the ability to imagine themselves as doing more than they thought they were capable of doing, including 
doing work that helped others. The intervention changed their aspirations and started a positive feedback 
mechanism. Soon these same sex workers "founded a union to fight for legalization... and other rights. Public 
events, such as festivals... were routinely organized by them, which contributed to the process of mobilization and 
the removal of stigma." (p. 6-8) The initial health intervention had sought out to do one thing, to reduce instances of 
HIV infection, but it left them with a bigger capacity to imagine, and this initiated a virtuous cycle. 
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  “demonstrate to women and men how gender is constructed socially.. and can be 
changed… to build a collective and alternative visions for gender relations…to help women to 
develop skills to assert themselves… to build a network of women and men… to help… 
pressurize for change” (Walters 1991, as cited in Batliwala 1994, p. 128)  21
 The goal of building women's self awareness was to make them understand how "gender 
is constructed socially," (p. 128) by social norms, institutions, and our everyday practices, and to 
then try and show the possibility that "ideas and representations" (Agarwal 1997, p. 1) of gender 
roles and expectations can be changed. Having discursive alternatives (Kabeer 1999), or in the 
words of popular education, showing women "alternative visions of gender relations," (Baltiwala 
1994, p. 128) is a key step towards bringing this realization to women. This also means that 
empowerment is something that must come from "within" instead of “something that can be 
done to” them (Cornwall 2016, p. 356).  
  Cornwall (2016) revisits the feminist literature which gave foundational work on 
empowerment, and argues that feminist thinkers such as Baltiwala (1993, 1994, 2007), Kabeer 
(1999), Rowlands (1996, 1997) and Gita Sen (1997), wanted to move away from seeing 
empowerment as something that can be given to women, but rather as a process which entailed 
recognizing the inequalities of power, and then building the ability to demand for their rights, 
and bring structural changes.  
 In just this definition, there are elements of empowerment that I have reviewed earlier, starting from the idea that 21
our behavior is socially determined, preferences and norms can be changed, women need to be able to have choices 
that are both material and discursive, and empowerment starts from an individual but it is also something that is 
driven through a collective effort. 
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They also went beyond seeing empowerment in terms of material and economic resources. There 
is also a social and political element. Empowerment is a “conscientization” process which 
engages people “in making sense of their worlds, their relations, their assumptions and beliefs, 
practices and values.” The second point is that empowerment is “relational,” and understanding 
of the “sociality of the concept” is vital. What these two points suggests is that though 
empowerment must come from within the individual, there needs to be a mobilizing force for 
political and social action, that is greater than the individual. This broadens the framework for 
analyzing empowerment, as something much broader than just concerning the individual and 
“individual self assertion.”  It brings out the “relational” aspect of empowerment, which 
highlights the importance of relationships, and an understanding that the individual is a part of a 
collective. (p. 344) 
 There are three foundational definitions of empowerment in particular, that I have used 
throughout this paper. Baltiwala (1994) envisions power as "control over material assets, 
intellectual resources and ideology." Material assets can be thought of as "physical, human, or 
financial" resources, ranging from "labour, land, and access to money." Where as intellectual 
resources can be understood in terms of "knowledge, ideas," and having control over them, 
means to have the ability to "generate, propagate, sustain and institutionalize specific sets of 
values, attitudes and behaviors."   Empowerment then is a “process” which “challenges 22
patriarchal [or existing] power relations,” with a goal of “gaining control over the sources of 
power” (p. 129). Rowlands (1996) highlights that the we must envision empowerment as a 
 Therefore, power comes from the ability to govern not only the distribution of "material" resources, but also from 22
the ability to "influence knowledge and ideology" which shape "social relations" in both the "public" and "private 
sphere.” (Baltiwala, p. 129) 
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process which will “lead people to believe themselves as able and entitled” to “occupy a decision 
making space,” in the household, community, or state, and this self awareness will give people 
who were “affected” a chance to “see themselves as having the capacity and the right to act and 
have influence.” (p. 87, as cited in Cornwall 2016, p. 344) Finally, Kabeer (1999) conceptualizes 
“power” as the “ability to make choices,” and empowerment is a “process” by which we 
“acquire” that ability to make choices. (p. 436)  
 After being introduced several ideas that have been central to our understandings of 
women's empowerment, we can move on how they are understood in more mainstream 
development practices today. This will be the focus of the rest of the paper. To begin with, there 
are points of tensions between how definitions, indicators, and measurements of empowerment 
are featured in development practices, with the foundational feminists conceptions of 
empowerment. Kabeer (1999) suggests that there is a gap between how the process of 
empowerment is envisioned in the advocacy of feminist goals, versus the “instrumental forms of 
advocacy,” which “combine gender equality and women’s empowerment,” because the former 
requires policy makers and planners to step out of the “conceptual territory of welfare, poverty 
and efficiency, and into the nebulous territory of power and social injustice.” In opting for a more 
instruments form of equality and empowerment, which suggests that it is advocated as a means 
to a larger set of “multiplier effects,” offering the potential to achieve more “familiar and 
approved goals,” such as economic growth, it has required both quantification and attempt to 
measure empowerment.  However, scholars question the extent to which empowerment can be 
“clearly defined, [and] let a lone measured,” therefore Kabeer (1999) sets out to study what the 
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implications are of “attempting to measure what is not easily measurable” and trying to translate 
“intrinsic arguments for feminist goals” with “instrumentalist” ones. (p. 436)  
 Kabeer (1999) first offers a critical perspective of  defining and measuring the resource 
aspect of of empowerment.  In the development literature, she writes that there is a “widespread 23
tendency” to talk about “access of resources,” which suggests that a changes in the women’s 
access to resources translates "automatically" to changes in the choices they are able to make. 
However, access to resources do not translate to "actual" choices, but rather, “potential” choices, 
and uses the association of land rights to women's empowerment to explain this. There is usually 
a “casual” connection made between “patrilineal principles of descent and inheritance,” which 
privileges males in terms of access to land, and as a result, low levels of “female autonomy.” 
However, as is often generalized in the case of South Asia, rules about land rights is not 
“uniform,” and varies among Hindus and Muslims. Muslim men and women can inherit 
property, although men tend to inherit twice as more, and even if they can inherit land, it is 
customary and expected by women to “waive their land rights to their  brothers.” While the 
waiving of land rights, is seen as a foregone access to an important economic resource and 
ability to make a choice. (p. 443) If we see this in phenomena terms of potential choices, then by 
waiving their land rights now, they are able “to strengthen their future claim on their brothers, 
should their marriage break down.” In a way, this waiving of rights becomes “a resource to 
bargain with” in the future. If the resources and income one has if a marriage were breaks down 
 Resources are thought of as there to begin with, they are the “pre-conditions” in the process of empowerment. 23
Acquiring these resources “enhances” our ability to make choices. They are acquired through our “social 
relationships,” that is, we are tied to one another, as bargaining agents in a family, or economic agents in the market, 
or as members participating in a community, and our positions in these domains determine our access to resources. 
But resources can also be thought of as something we can claim in the "future," not just something we have now. 
(Kabeer 1999, p. 445)
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what determines one’s threat point and bargaining strengths, this has indirectly raised their 
bargaining ability. The waiving of land rights has by sisters, has in turn given them “a material 
basis to a moral entitlement,” almost acting as a guarantee issued in the name of the women to 
make claims in the future. (p. 444) 
 Kabeer (1999) describes agency as an “ability to define one’s goals and act upon them,” 
and this makes up the second aspect of empowerment.  The problems with  defining and 24
measuring agency is that not all types of agency have the "same consequential significance" for 
women's lives, so the presence of some type of decision making ability, is not always evident of 
empowerment. (p. 446) When we view agency within the framework of the bargaining or 
decision making in economic analysis, we need to be aware that there are some types agencies 
which will be given to women, for example, making decisions on cooking food, because women 
are expected to make those decisions. The way we measure agency, or its existence, is usually 
based on responses to questionnaires that ask women about the roles that they play when the 
household has to make different types of decisions. Kabeer gives a literature review of many of 
these studies, and then suggests that there is clearly a “hierarchy of decisions” that a household 
has to make, and studies can show that women play a role in making decisions that were 
"assigned to women anyway by preexisting gender roles and responsibilities," but they tell little 
about their ability to to make "strategic life choices" or choices that the women were not able to 
 Agency enters the social science literature in the form of “bargaining and negotiation… decision making” (Kabeer 24
1999, p. 438). Amartya Sen, in his cooperative conflict model (an expansion of the intra-household bargaining 
models) sees people’s decision making ability as agency.  Sen (1999) writes in the chapter “Women’s Agency and 
Social Change,” that the movement towards a bargaining model, from analyzing the household as a unitary agent, is 
also parallel to a shift in the objective of women’s movements, from demanding wellbeing to demanding agency, 
where women are no longer passive agents in a altruistic household, but active agents who are part of a cooperative 
conflict with other members. In his analysis, a woman’s ability to earn an independent income, be employed outside 
of the home, have ownership rights, (p. 191) are some of the resources that enhances her ability to “define their own 
life choices and pursue their own goals” (Kabeer 1999, p. 438). 
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make in the “past.” (p. 447) However, studies can also underestimate the decision making ability 
of women. The “statistical perspectives on decision making,” or the survey modality by which 
we measure agency, is often a “simple window on complex realities,” which do not reveal the 
“subtle negotiations that go on between women and men in their private lives,” such as the 
“private forms of empowerment,” mentioned earlier, that women have taken up, which gives 
them a “backstage influence in decision making processes.” (p. 448) The way we measure this 
very concept can actually undermine the agency of some women.  
 Finally, identify whether an achievement outcome  can be  "valid measure," or evidence 25
of women's empowerment, Kabeer (1999) suggests that we need to consider "whose agency" was 
involved in the process, and if this outcome "transformed prevailing inequities in resources and 
agency" rather than reinforcing them or leaving them unaffected (p. 452) Kabeer gives an 
example of this identification challenge, with a study (Kishor 1997) that measures the effects of 
women's empowerment on two achievement outcomes, infant survival rates and infant 
immunization. Kishor (1997) identifies “direct” and “indirect” (“source” and “setting”) 
indicators of women's empowerment, and measures their effects on the two achievement 
outcomes.  They study finds that the “indirect source/setting” indicators of women’s 26
empowerment have a greater effect on children’s health. (as cited in Kabeer 1999, p. 449) 
 Resources and agency come together to constitute as “capabilities” (Sen 1990, 1997, 1999), which is the 25
“potential” people can have for living the lives that the value. Capabilities are not an end in itself, but instead play an 
instrumental role to achieve certain, preferred ends, ways of “being and doing” that Sen refers to as “functioning.” 
There are many ways of “being and doing,” and these outcomes, or “achievements” make up the third dimension of 
choice, and subsequently empowerment. Empowerment becomes both a process, as highlighted by resources and 
agency dimensions, as well as an end result, reflective of a new social and economic outcome, as achievements. 
(Kabeer 1999, p. 438)
  Examples of direct measures of empowerment are devaluation of women, women’s emancipation, equality in 26
marriage, financial autonomy. Examples of indirect (source) measures are participation in the modern sector, 
lifetime exposure to employment, and indirect (setting) measures are family structure, marital advantage. (Kishor 
1997, as cited in Kabeer 1999)
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Although the “direct” measures might not have fully captured women’s empowerment, an 
alternate explanation that Kabeer (1999) provides is that women already have a “pre-assigned 
sphere of jurisdiction” over the care and upbringing of children. This means making any 
“improvement” in this sphere, which capture’s women’s “ability to take effective action … to the 
welfare of their children,” should be seen rather as improvement in “efficacy” as caretakers 
rather than being reflective empowerment. (p. 450) Children’s wellbeing do depend on women’s 
agency, but not as “wives,” which the “direct” measures of empowerment would have 
considered, but rather as “mothers.” While both the achievements in the study are “highly held 
values from a variety of perspectives,” and the outcome depended greatly on the effectiveness of 
women as “agents,” the achievements did not “by itself necessarily imply a shift in underlying 
power structures,” since women were effective agents only “within prescribed gender roles” as 
mothers. (p. 451)   
Implications of feminist insights on our understanding of gender empowerment 
 From the literature review above, it is starting to become clear that empowerment should 
be seen beyond the dimension of resources, and should incorporate agency measures (Kabeer 
1999). We need to address an individual's preferences and that it can potentially change to be 
more in line with their own self interests, goals and aspirations. Since preferences are socially 
constructed (Sen 1990, Agarwal 1997), there needs to be a recognition that individuals are social 
beings and so interventions should be aimed not only at the individual, but also at the community 
level.  
 The end goal of empowerment is individual agency as well as access and control of 
resources. Control over resources can be both material in terms of economic resources, as well as 
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intellectual, where the latter can be thought of as determining an individual's ability to shape 
ideas and knowledge (Baltiwala 1994, p. 129). Agency is referring to people's ability to define 
and act on their aspirations and goals, to have the freedom to choose between alternative set of 
realities or the potential ways of being and doing (Kabeer 1999). People, however, may have 
false or incorrect perceptions about their preferences, ie. preferences may not always be 
reflective of the individual (Sen 1990). For example, in patriarchal societies, it is not that women 
are simply making the wrong choices, because they’re constrained by repressive social norms, 
but norms interact with individual’s own perceptions of themselves. So women become coopted 
into the system by internalizing patriarchal norms, and are willing to settle for less, conflate their 
self interests with the self interests of others in the family. (Sen 1990, Agarwal 1997)  
 If the problem is with self perceptions, then we should intervene at the level of the 
individual. However, if perceptions are socially constructed, as in perceptions are a reflection of 
our day to day lives and social norms, then we need to move beyond the notion of false 
perceptions. The language of falseness and incorrectness might undermine the agency of some 
women who may “overtly" seem to be accepting the inequities in their lives, but "subvertly" 
employ strategies that enable them to have a say and an influence in the bargaining process 
(Agarwal 1997, p. 25). Perceptions are formed by our lived experience, or can be a reflection of 
a "deeper level of reality" that is not always visible but historically and socially conditions our 
behavior (Kabeer 1999, p. 441). Instead of saying that women have false perceptions, we can 
come to see women as being in a state of “doxa.” The idea of "doxa" posits the possibility that 
there are alternative realities to the one that women (in the state of "doxa") are living in. 
(Bourdieu 1977, Agarwal 1997, Kabeer 1999) These alternative realties or different ways of 
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being and doing are constrained by social norms, which Agarwal (1997) argues is changeable 
and not fixed. If the constraining norms are patriarchal norms, then what we are trying to do by 
bargaining and contesting with these norms, is that we are trying to expand the choice set that is 
available to a woman, so a woman is left with more opportunities (ways of doing and being) that 
is socially acceptable and sanctioned. This is why interventions should be at the level of the 
community because norms and beliefs are formed and regulated at this level, outside of the 
individual and the household.  
 Stern et al. (2005) makes this argument in my final chapter, where he argues that an 
individual's empowerment is party constrained by their external environment and so 
empowerment is partly achieved by "relaxing" or removing these constraints (p. 226).    27
 Sen (2008) and Campbell (2003) give examples of how in the bio-medial discourse, HIV-AIDs 
is treated as an individual phenomena, and so the interventions are very individualistic. But it 
largely ignores the impact that the society can have on the individual’s chances of contracting it, 
as well as on their experience of living with the disease.   28
 In the next chapter, Stern et al. (2005) gives examples of the ways people's external environment can act as a 27
constraint to their empowerment, he writes that  an "individual exists in a family, economic, social, cultural, and 
political contexts that plays a powerful role in the ability to shape one's lives and may impose strong "external 
constraints"" (p. 102). He gives an example from Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) in India, an 
organization that works with mostly poor women of lower caste, to offer them services ranging from legal support 
and offering credit, to providing training and child care. Since lower caste women face social constraints because of 
both their caste and gender,  SEWA has helped them demand for better working conditions and treatment, as well as 
put their children to school. They have found observable differences in the "confidence and self esteem" of these 
women, and in their communities too, seeing lower caste women participate more have also "raised their status" 
among other villages. (p. 206)
 The experience with how HIV-AIDs has failed to be a community driven intervention can explain this idea further. 28
Sen (2008) and Campbell (2003) explain how biomedical discourses explains that the HIV virus is contracted by an 
individual, most of the time through a voluntary act, such as sexual intercourse, and sometimes it happens through 
involuntary acts, such as by birth or blood transfusions. Therefore, campaigns are led to prevent an individual from 
contracting it. This discourse however, does not actually account for the spaces that the individuals occupy, in their 
village, community, and society at large. These individuals are implicated in greater power relations, than just one 
involving humans against a deadly virus, such as of gender, race and sex.  Communities either restrain or enable 
people from taking control over their lives. Finally, in the biomedical discourse, the HIV virus is impartial to whom 
it infects, other than the individual bodies that are most susceptible. But the infectious agent “takes advantage of 
every human fault and failing, every denial of basic human rights.” (Campbell 2003, p. 12).  
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 However, is disempowerment simply not having an ability to choose? If we exogenously 
give choices to women, is that considered empowerment? Is giving women a choice to exercise 
their preferences enough? Kabeer (1999) had pointed out that when we measure any 
achievement outcomes, we need to consider “whose agency” was used in the formation of this 
outcomes (p. 452). If empowerment means also the ability to have and exercise one's agency, 
then surely disempowerment must also include not having a role or a space to contribute to the 
negotiation and formation of norms (Rowlands 1996). Empowerment comes from being able to 
define one’s own preferences (and aspirations and goals), so women should have a constructive 
role in what those choices are. If we think of expanding choices in terms of an exogenous 
intervention, then it contradicts the end goal of individual agency. Empowerment therefore needs 
to be rethought as a political and social engagement, where women themselves play a role in 
creating these set of options.  
 In the following chapter, I also talk about women's own political empowerment, which is 
closer to this aspect of empowerment. In this case, women are not only preventing society from 
constraining their own formation of preferences, but women are also contributing to the way 
social norms change. In another instance, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) give an example from an 
experience of a family planning campaign in rural Bangladesh, where simply giving women 
more ways to manage their fertility, by supplying more contraceptives and having health workers 
run awareness campaigns was not enough to convince women to adopt modern contraceptive 
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practices. The program had to instead rely on some of the women in those communities itself, 
who then created new possibilities in managing fertility for other women.  29
 More specifically, in this family planning campaign in rural Bangladesh, health workers from women’s own 29
communities were trained and asked to visit households where women were “in purdah and therefore limited in their 
mobility, bringing the discussion of contraception to places where it used to be taboo.” By talking to women, who 
they knew and could identify with, slowly they were able to realize a new possibility in their lives as mothers, and 
seeing one of ‘them’ use contraceptives, made it easier to adjust to this new social reality. (Banerjee and Duflo 2011)
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Chapter 3: Development, changing preferences, and the RCT political participation 
literature  
Development and empowerment  
 "In its emphasis on family, community, social, and governance constraints, the 
concept of empowerment goes well beyond levels of investment in human capital and 
physical assets. Empowerment centers on people's ability to act and make effective 
decisions on key aspects of their lives. It can also include individuals perception of her 
or his role and expectations in life. Thus an individual's preferences and approach to 
behavior make up part of the story of empowerment" (Stern 2005, p. 184) 
  
 The idea of individual agency suggests that if individuals should able to define their 
goals, act on them, and be free to choose the types of lives they value, then in order to make this 
happen, they need to address and be able to change their self perception and beliefs, so it is more 
in line with their goals and aspirations. Preferences should be changeable and endogenous. This 
is a shift in thought from neoclassical economics which, even in its models of intra household 
bargaining, still maintains the notion of fixed preferences.  
 In Stern et al. (2005), we find that the rhetoric has clearly changed, as they stress that 
empowerment is partly achieved by laying out a platform where individuals are able to freely 
form their preferences (p. 262). One of the authors, Nicholas Stern, was the ex-chief economist 
of the World Bank and we can see this as an attempt to bring in ideas from outside, such as the 
field of behavioral economics, feminist economics, and cultural anthropology, into mainstream 
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economics literature.  For example, the World Development Report 2003 from the World Bank 
(2002), puts emphasis on “sustainable” development, by moving away from focusing on policy 
outcomes to “processes” for decision making , which has the idea of "preference change at its 30
core" (as cited in Stern 2005, p. 258). 
 Stern et al. (2005) takes development to mean ultimately the empowerment of 
individuals,  this is the "main goal of development.” Their understanding of empowerment 31
follows closely to the capabilities approach and is defined as the “ability [of an individual] to 
shape” his or her life.  (p. 84) They build on Sen’s (1999) placing of importance on capabilities 32
over outcomes or functioning, by suggesting that "enhancing the [the poor's] capabilities to 
improve their lives- is an end itself, regardless of how it affects economic growth” (p. 85).  33
Lastly, an empowered individual should "themselves be agents," and that "they have choices and 
be involved in the creation of wealth."  Seeing individuals as agents, who define their own terms 
of the types of lives they want to lead and contributes to decision making, is in line with the idea 
of individual agency.   Seeing individuals as agents, is also consistent with the idea that 34
empowerment cannot be given to individuals (Cornwall 2016).  
 One of these could be the reservation policy in India that I talk about at the end of this chapter, which mandates 30
women to lead in public decision making spaces, such as village councils. 
 Though Stern et al. (2005) is widely talking about empowerment of individuals, and not women, They still place a 31
strong emphasis on women, as a group of individuals, that empowerment is concerned with. 
 Or in other words, "the freedom one has to live the type of life that one choses” (Stern et al. 2005, p. 103)32
 So while education can increase job opportunities, raise incomes, and lead to economic growth, becoming a 33
"means of achieving development... it is also an end in itself, because being educated is a capability.” (Stern 2005, p. 
85)
  For Stern et al. (2005), there are three elements towards empowering individuals. The first is to develop their 34
human capital and access to physical assets. The second is to relax external constraints, which are obstacles imposed 
by family, community, society, and culture that they are situated in. And finally, the third element is to ease internal 
constraints, which they "impose on themselves." (p. 142) Internal constraints also include "perceived role in family 
or society, and the capacity to aspire" (p. 243). Therefore I will use women and individuals interchangeably in my 
writings on Stern et al. (2005). 
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 Development is closely tied with empowerment in the RCT literature as well. Duflo 
(2012) provides a literature review which summarizes the state of knowledge in the mainstream 
literature on empowerment.  One of the branches of this literature is on women's political 
empowerment or political participation (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Beaman et al. 2009; 
Beaman et al. 2012), which I will analyze in greater detail in the final section of this chapter. 
Duflo (2012) broadly defines women's empowerment in resource and agency dimensions, as 
having access to better education and health, having labour market opportunities, acquiring legal 
rights, greater political participation, and more decision making ability (p. 1051-1052). But these 
variables are also constitutive of development itself, therefore empowerment is closely related to 
development, as it is seen as "improving the ability of women to access the constituents of 
development” (p. 1053) Lastly, while development can drive down inequalities that women face 
and empower them, it is not enough to fully bring about empowerment, as discrimination can 
still persist. Targeting women's empowerment itself is a "desired goal in itself" because 
empowering is intrinsically valuable, and empowering women first also "accelerates 
development," and this is instrumentally valuable (p. 1064).   
Relaxing external constraints 
 Stern et al. (2005) suggest that external obstacles placed on women which prevent them 
from taking full “advantage of economic opportunities” and “participating” fully in the 
development process. These obstacles can be a form of discriminatory practices, based on 
gender, but also race, ethnicity, caste, and religion. (p. 226) 
 In thinking about empowerment as being partly shaped by people's external constraints, 
the themes of “participation” and “inclusion” emerge (p. 103). At the core of the idea of 
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inclusion, is people's social relationships and the way that an individual is being implicated in 
many forms of power relations, such as gender, race, or class. “Exclusion” is then the constraints 
placed on the individual's participation from some activities or groups. As Stern et al. (2005) 
write, "empowerment and inclusion depends on the functioning of social network and on 
individual's location in them." And so an individual's empowerment is related to their "social 
capital," which is the "abilities that social networks confer" to an individual, or a group of 
individuals, such as women. In other words, social capital is the extent to which social networks 
enable or disable an individual or a group to shape their lives. (p. 143) 
 Social exclusion is also different from poverty, and for Stern et al. (2005), this is an 
important distinction because empowerment as a process is often related to poverty alleviation.  35
A person’s material wellbeing, or any other measures we may use to measure poverty, has “no 
relevance to social exclusion.” This distinction posits the possibility that even women from even 
higher income households can still be socially excluded from participating in some important 
activities, such as decision making activities. One of the advantages of focusing on exclusion 
over poverty, is that it gives a greater emphasis on gender issues, and brings other 
intersectionalities forward, along the lines of race and class. For example, the idea of social 
exclusion differentiates the experiences of women from different castes. Certain forms of 
institutional discrimination can exclude women and minorities from acquiring certain jobs or 
receiving benefits such as education, while privileging men, or men and women from higher 
 Duflo (2012) suggests that development can ease structural constraints placed on households, by changing 35
exogenous circumstances facing a resource constrained household and giving households more choices, can 
inadvertently help women. Increasing the household's ability to "weather crisis," by "relaxing the constraints" that 
resource poor households face, can inadvertently help the women and girls in it, because in times of scarcity and 
vulnerability, "tragic choices are resolved at the expense of women." (p. 1055) 
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castes.  While women can be a part of a group, but they might have limited power to influence 
decisions, if there is a case of elite capture, where they are among women from higher castes, or 
other village leaders that are men. Therefore, empowerment should be “seen as effective 
participation,” because women may participate in something, in the sense of “being present,” but 
they are not effectively participating, if they are “unheard or ignored." (p. 104-105) 
 Participation of women, and other minorities, in the public sphere, or decision making 
spaces, is important, because it is one of the ways in which women and minorities can "develop 
the capacity to aspire to something different.” (p. 229)  Appadurai (2004) suggests that for the 36
poor and the marginalized, developing a capacity to aspire, is to do with having a "voice," which 
means that they must be able to "debate, contest and critique" and essentially, be able to think 
critically of themselves and the way they are positioned in inequities (social, political, cultural), 
that prevent them from reaping economic opportunities. Therefore, public action needs to not 
only ensure rights to poor people, but it needs to foster "voice and representation to poor people 
in public decision making." (as cited in Stern 2005, p. 229)  Effective participation is an 
important avenue towards empowerment, and this will be discussed in detail, in the RCT studies 
on women's political participation.  
Internal constraints: endogenous and changing preferences 
 The bargaining household models took preferences to be fixed, and were concerned with 
the constraints facing a household. In some of the models, women's bargaining strength inside of 
the household dependent on external factors outside of the household. Duflo (2012) writes that 
women's lack of opportunities in the labour market can explain for their "unequal treatment" in 
 The capacity to aspire as something different, has changing preferences and perceptions of one self at the heart of 36
it, and will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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the household. For example, if women do not work outside of their homes, their needs are 
undervalued relative to men, because their contribution from household work is undervalued 
relative to waged employment.  Parents might also not invest in their education and health as 
much, if they perceive their daughters to be married at a young age and go take care of their 
husband’s households, rather than seeking employment outside. So increasing their labour 
market opportunities for women, will make investments in their health and schooling more worth 
while. The idea is that increasing opportunities outside, by adding more choices for women, 
without directly empowering them from within, can still change incentives of parents and lead 
towards desired outcomes for women. (p. 1057) Duflo (2012) suggests that "a quiet revolution is 
happening, even if households are not fully aware of consequences of their individual choice" (p. 
1058).  
 Stern et al. (2005) argues against this notion, suggesting instead that parents might be 
more compelled to send their daughters to school because of a change in their preferences (p. 
247). Preference change provides us with a new way of thinking about economic behavior. 
Preferences has been the topic of concern for feminist economists (as such Sen 1990), political 
economists, as well as "anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists," but is usually outside 
the scope of conventional economics (p. 243). The idea of “endogenous preferences” contradict 
the assumption made in  neoclassical economics that individuals have stable preferences (p. 
244).  
  Development becomes not only about changing people's social and economic conditions 
(p. 243). But if we take development to mean the empowerment of individuals, their ability to 
shape their lives, then we need to also bring in their preferences for the types of lives that they 
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wish to live. So development happens to an individual, or individuals are empowered, also 
through a change in their preferences. Individuals are empowered when they are able to make 
choices that are strategic and valuable for them. But a that choice, what "people do- their 
behavior- depends on their preferences.... [and] also on their circumstances and constrains” (p. 
244). While circumstances and constraints shape an individual's social and economic conditions, 
preferences is concerned with the individual's internal constraints.   37
 Stern et al. (2005) suggests that there is a “casual relationship between economic 
conditions and preferences,” (p. 246) but the direction of causality flow both ways. A change in 
economic conditions, when there is a new shift in the economic equilibrium, can lead to a change 
in people's preferences, and at the same time a change in preferences, can lead to a shift in the 
economic equilibrium.  
 In Duflo (2012), we encounter women who refuse to rent their land out to their husbands, 
even though they know they are foregoing more productivity by not doing so, because women 
are faced with more insecure rights to their land than their male counterparts. They are putting 
their entitlements to their land away at risk, if they give it over to men to farm it. If those same 
women now receive legal and equal access to land as men, they can probably start thinking about 
“more possibilities over a much longer term than they had preciously envisaged.” This would 
lead to a change in their “time preferences,” since they have secure rights to their land, they can 
now rent out their land, and make an investment, that will give them greater returns over a longer 
time. (p. 1069)   
 Preferences form through our “personal histories of social and economic experiences, and interactions.” Our 37
families, community and schooling, are the spaces where preferences are formed.(Stern 2005, p. 243)
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 But if there is a change in preferences,  then this “affects economic outcomes through 38
the choices that individuals and households make,” so preferences can change, even without a 
change in economic conditions, as the examples below will show. (Stern et al. 2005, p. 246)  
 The education enrollment rate for girls has changed positively in low and moderately low 
income countries. Dulfo (2012) writes that in 2010, the enrollment rate for girls and boys in 
secondary schools was 34 percent and 41 percent respectively, compared to 22 percent and 30 
percent respectively  twenty years ago (p. 1051). If we think of this phenomena in terms of 
conventional economic thinking, it would lead us to assume that opportunities in the labour 
market for girls have been expanding, and there is better information for parents about expected 
returns to education. All of this builds parents incentives to educate girls, they consider this 
investment worth while. This is the explanation we receive from Duflo (2012). However, this 
does not answer, for example, why opportunities changed in the first place? After all, are 
opportunities not new set of choices, and are choices not a product of our preferences?  “Non 
economists,” therefore, would present a different explanation. They would argue that girls were 
not sent to schools, because of certain repressive ideas about what a women’s role in society 
should be, that held girls at home and doing domestic work. These represented their preferences, 
and were usually “culturally determined,” which can change even in the “absences of changing 
economic conditions.” (Stern et al. 2005, p. 247)  
 State led policies can also target preference change, and bring about new economic 
outcomes, without changing economic conditions. Das Gupta (2004) talks about the “subtle ways 
 Stern et al. (2005) suggests that preferences change with “shifting economic conditions and 38
experiences” (examples) as well as “sociocultural transition,” such as “social movements…  [or] changes in power 
and ideology of leaders, which might be reflected in changes in education programs… [or] exposure to new 
ideas” (p. 246). 
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in which states influence the manifestations of cultural beliefs and values” and lead to changes in 
preferences over women’s roles (p. 258, as cited in Stern 2005, p. 248). Building on this idea, 
Stern et al. (2005) suggests that by this reasoning, when a government or NGO tries to 
incentivize parents to send their daughters to school, they do so not just by talking about the 
opportunities that education can give their daughters, or talking about the economic and social 
returns of education, but they would also try to “persuade the parents- often particularly the 
father- to think differently about the kind of life they want their daughters to lead.” (p. 248) 
 In the above example, it is not important to distinguish between the effects of changes in 
information, versus the effect of changes in perceptions, in determining parents' decisions to send 
their daughters to school, "in some cases [such as this] the distinction will not matter much for 
policy.” We might be better off using information on the job opportunities, as well as convincing 
parents to change their views about what roles their daughters should play in society. (p. 252) 
 However, in the case of convincing women to take up contraceptives, it is vital that 
policy is aimed at changing preferences of women. This particular example puts to light that it is 
not enough for there to be an economic change, as in the availability of contraceptives and better 
access to family planning clinics, might represent a shift in the economic equilibrium, but there 
must be a shift in the social equilibrium, for women to actually take up contraceptives. Munshi 
and Myaux (2003), and Schultz and Joshi (2007) talk about similar experiences from family 
planning campaigns in rural Bangladesh, where female health workers from their own local 
communities were trained and asked to visit homes where culturally women traditionally lived in 
isolation from other men besides their own family. Therefore women did not frequently interact 
with others outside and mostly spent time in the confinement of their homes. But these 
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campaigns made the health workers visit the women in their homes and essentially in spaces 
where sex is never openly talked about. By talking to women, who they knew and could identify 
with, slowly they were able to realize a new possibility in their lives as mothers, and seeing one 
of ‘them’ use contraceptives, made it easier to adjust to this new social reality. (as cited in Stern 
et al. 2005; and Banarjee and Duflo 2011). 
What does changing preferences mean for development and policies? 
 Stern et al.’s (2005) argument about internal constraints attacks the core of standard 
economics theory, where preferences are fixed and policy decisions are made by aggregating 
individual preferences, and essentially trying to give people what they want (what is in line to 
their preferences). The underlying assumption is the same as in utility theory where individual 
will fare better if they are able to consume "a bundle of goods and services ranked higher in the 
given preference ordered." This is how welfare is measured, by looking at whether an outcome is 
ranked higher in an individual's preference ordering. An alternative way to assess welfare of a 
policy measure, is to see whether policy expands freedoms of individuals, and especially the 
"freedoms for many people." This represents a step in policy towards trying to expand the 
individual agency of people, which is central to their empowerment. (p. 244)   39
 There are several important questions that is raised by Stern et al. (2005) after addressing 
changing preferences, listed in their respective order,   
"(a) If preference change is an important part of the development story, how does it 
affect the way we assess different situations or development approaches?... (b) If we are 
 Sen (1990) had tried to distinguish between a person's "wellbeing and agency" saying that "a person ay have 39
various goals and objectives other than the pursuit of his or her well-being" and it is the "agency aspect that is most 
influenced by a person's sense of obligations and perception of legitimate behavior." What this implies is that 
focusing on individual agency, rather than individual wellbeing, can also bring in the analysis of how social 
constraints interact with individual behavior, by influencing their self perceptions of their interests. 
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accessing wellbeing of a women, do we use the preferences she has now, or the 
preferences she will have in the future?... (c) If preferences are taken as changeable, 
what is the foundation for our policy advice?... (and d) Should development agencies be 
in the business of trying to change preferences?" (Stern et al. 2005, p.  252-262) 
 Starting with the first two questions, if we accept that development of an individual or a 
group, may initiate change in their preferences, then it will be hard to access how they are doing 
(their wellbeing), through a neoclassical utility based approach, where preferences are fixed. This 
leads to the second question. If our goal is to empower a woman, and if we are to use a 
neoclassical framework of welfare analysis, we can assess how she is faring in terms of the 
preferences she has now, and how close she is to having it actualized or satisfied.  But the 40
process of empowerment can also initiate a change in her preferences, so an empowered woman 
will not only be moving closer to her preferences, but she would have moved to a new set of 
preferences. (p. 252) 
 There are two ways of dealing with this issue of changing preferences and welfare 
assessment, one within the neoclassical framework (Becker 1996), and the other in terms of 
capabilities (Sen 1999). (as cited in Stern, p. 254) The way we understand individual welfare can 
guide us into designing and accessing policies. In the neoclassical framework, we access 
individual welfare through the construction of individual preferences and utility. We then 
proceed to measure what is good for people by seeing how close we are to satisfying their 
 We are not even in the territory where we can question if there might be something wrong with her preferences 40
now. As mentioned in my second chapter, the neoclassical framework broadly overlooks this possibility. 
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preferences.  One of the ways we can measure the wellbeing of an individual and still hold the 41
logic that their preferences or tastes  would change, is by creating a "meta [or] extended-utility 42
function" (Becker 1996, as cited in Stern 2005, p. 254).  
 Becker (1996) argues that the assumption of fixed preferences should be modified and the 
idea that tastes can develop into the future should be brought in. Swann (1999) explains that in 
Becker's (1996) extended utility function, a person's utility over a good, is conditional on two 
stocks of capital that is held by the individual- personal and social capital. Personal capital 
explains how an individual's tastes are influenced by their past behavior, and expected future 
behavior. People form habits, and tastes (or preferences) remains fixed for some goods over a 
period of time through habit formation. For example, if people are unemployed, they may 
become risk averse and their choices reflect their preferences for less risk taking. People also 
have experiences in their youth, which might shape their tastes for particular things for a life 
time. Social capital, measures the influence of others on an individual's utility function, and it 
comes from the idea that "men and women want respect, recognition, prestige, acceptance and 
power from their family, friends, peers and others" and so they make certain choices, such as 
devoting resources towards taking care of elders, "with an eye to pleasing peers and others in 
their network" (Becker 1996, p. 12 ), and building their social capital.  Any changes in a 
 Welfare or wellbeing, is a normative position, reflecting the things that intrinsically good for human beings. But 41
how do we find out "what is good" for a person, or what gives them utility? The prevailing view in welfare 
economics tries to answer this, by suggesting that welfare can be measured by the satisfaction of preferences. By 
this we mean, someone is better off if what "[they] prefer comes to pass," not that this will make them "feel 
satisfied." Individuals are driven by self interests, have perfect information, and have a fixed preference ordering. So 
by this logic, people should be "good judges" of what they want and need, and "prefer what is good for them." Now 
that satisfying preferences, constitutes welfare, policy makers can make "people better off by molding their wants," 
or aggregating their individual preferences. This view largely ignores the fact that preferences may be based on 
"mistaken beliefs... people may sacrifice their own wellbeing... preferences may reflecting past manipulation or 
distorting psychological influences." (as cited in Hausman 2013) This is a concern picked up by many feminist 
economists, such as Sen (1990), and in the current literature, by Stern et al. (2005).
 Becker uses taste to mean preferences. 42
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preference for a good, can therefore be attributed to changes in the personal or social capital 
functions. (as cited in Swann 1999, p. 289). This also means that a person's current preference 
ordering, has tried to incorporate "all possibilities now and in the future." In summary, Becker's 
(1996) utility function tries to account for all of the changes in preferences that can occur to a 
person.  
 According to Stern et al. (2005), this is a very unrealistic approach, to argue that a person 
is "aware of how experience, argument, and interaction could shape her or his preferences over 
time." (p. 254) Especially in development countries, where the future is mostly unpredictable, 
because of the political, economic and social instabilities facing people. The other limitation to 
this idea is that it is not easy to "identify [as well as quantify] the social and personal capital 
variables"  because they deal with "personal experience, past consumption, culture, and social 
history." (p. 255) 
  Policy making can be both driven by the idea of individual preferences to determine 
welfare, or without preferences, and instead through the idea of freedom and opportunity.  
 measure what is good for a group of people, by aggregating the welfare of individuals.  The 43
way we make choices for a society, is therefore, based on the same principles that guide 
individual choices.   There are two lines of thought, one preceding the other, that inform the 44
social choice literature. The earlier public choice framework, is concerned with hashing out fixed 
 Social choice theory deals with how societies, and not individuals make choices. Harsanyi (1955, 1977a) suggests 43
that if "individual preferences and social evaluations both satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory" then we can 
can determine social evaluations by the "weigted sum of indiviudal utilities," or in other words, by assigning weights 
and then summing individual utilities. Expected utility theory concerns how we can chose rationally when we are 
uncertain about about outcomes of our decisions. (as cited in Briggs 2017)
 Social theory, is concerned with how decisions are made collectively, it is the “study of systems and institutions 44
for making collective choices, choices that affect a group of people” (Kelly 1988, as cited in Peter 2005, p. 16), and 
it is traditionally “preoccupied with solving the problem of aggregating individual preferences” (Alderman 1995)
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preferences of individuals, and aggregating it into policy choices. This was once a prevailing 
assumption in welfare economics, of  a “benevolent dictator” that was “in charge of 
implementing socially desirable policies.”(Peter 2005, p. 16) One can also draw a parallel with 
Becker’s (1976, 1981) new home economics, which models the entire household's welfare 
function as a part of the individual's welfare function, who is altruistic head of the household. As 
in, an altruistic head of the household, makes a collective decision for the wellbeing of all of its 
members.  
 However, Arrow (1963) pointed out that a benevolent dictator cannot “gain legitimacy” 
in a democratic environment, unless there was a way where collective decision was made by 
“aggregating individual preferences about policy alternatives into a social preference 
ordering” (as cited in Peter 2005, p. 17).  Therefore, the subsequent model of social choice, used 
the assumption that individuals come with fixed preferences in an electoral system and vote for a 
preferred outcome. People elect those that match their preferences. In the following section, I 
will talk about a RCT study which measures the effects of women's political participation on the 
provisioning of public goods (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004), and argue that the assumptions 
made in this study reflects the social choice theory of Arrow (1963), where increasing political 
power of women leads to outcomes that better reflect their fixed preferences. If ten women want 
a specific policy preference, they may not talk to each other, but they can elect, and vote, leading 
to outcomes reflective of their fixed preferences. In the Indian state of Bihar, alcoholism among 
rural men is a common and accepted behavior. During an election campaign for the state 
minister, a group of women demanded one of the candidates to ban alcohol, and his reply, "if you 
vote for me, I will ban it," took over headlines across the country soon after. Once he won the 
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seat, he was compelled at any costs to bring about the ban, and women have taken it among 
themselves to regulate and enforce it in their homes and communities. (Anand 2017)  
 However, Stern et al. (2005) highlight that there is a problem with using preferences of an 
individual to guide social decision making.  It turns into a paternalistic view of social decision 
making, where "we adopt a position that we favor one of the individual's possible preferences set 
over another in social decision making.” (p. 257) 
 In the context of women's empowerment in development world, another issue arises over 
who is taking this normative stance. Stern et al. (2005) give an example of compulsory education 
policies as being paternalistic. But a deeper problem with paternalizing education, in the context 
of women's empowerment, can be attributed to Nussbaum’s (2000, 2003) claim that literacy is 
not just a capability, but a “universal human right” that is “needed [for people] to engage with 
political and social institutions" and to "fully think... one must be literate in ways appropriate to 
those institutions" (Charusheela 2008, p. 6). In this post-colonial critique of Nusbaum (2000, 
2003), Charusheela (2008) highlights that by making such a claim, we “naturalize a higher value 
accorded to literate people,” and as a result “legitimize the power structure that we are trying to 
undo,” between the literate and the illiterate, the developed and under-developed peoples (p. 9). 
Charusheela (2008) gives examples of the many ways illiterate women have gained different 
forms of empowerment, including political empowerment. But this dichotomy of literate and the 
illiterate, undermines the agencies of those illiterate women.  
 Therefore, there can be a crucial tension between empowerment and paternalistic 
policies. But if preference change is at the base of policy making (Stern et al. 2005), isn't taking a 
normative stand on which preference needs to be changed also paternalistic, and will lead us to 
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the same issues highlighted by Charusheela (2008)? A crucial tension that comes up in Stern et 
al. (2005) is whether "development agencies should be in the business of changing preferences," 
and what implications does this have for empowerment. This is why Stern et al. (2005) suggest 
that development should be about providing a space where individuals can come and have a 
chance to form and reform their preferences themselves. (p. 262) In this line of thinking, what is 
important is the “processes” for decision making which might bring preference change rather 
than targeting and changing preferences themselves (p. 258). 
Alternative view: policies that focus on processes and expanding freedoms 
 Sen (1990) had argued that individual preferences and utility theory are not an accurate 
measure of one's wellbeing, and rejects the notion of aggregating individual preferences to 
determine social welfare. The alternative approach to policy making that Stern et al. (2005) 
propose "recognizes the difficulties of choosing among an individual's preferences" and so the 
idea of maximizing utility "over a set of [aggregating] preferences," by trying to give people 
what they want, is dropped entirely. This move is therefore a shift towards "notion of capability, 
opportunity, or freedom, an approach that echoes both Sen and the Austrian school" as the basis 
of policy making. The capability approach stresses that what is important is not the outcome 
itself, but the alternative set of choices one could have made. In the Austrian school, Hayek 
(1984) sees the "market as a process of exercising mutually compatible freedoms." (as cited in 
Stern 2005, p 256)  
 In addition, since capabilities is about having the freedom to choose what one values, 
when we expand one's freedoms, there is a change in preferences and essentially a change in 
what one values. Changing what we value is the essence of "changing gender roles." (p. 256) As 
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argued in the earlier chapter, empowering women is achieved partly by expanding the 
possibilities of what women are able to do and changing people's attitudes towards gender roles 
that limit can act as constraints for women. Expanding freedoms is therefore synonymous to 
expanding the choice sets available to women that is socially accepted. However, women 
themselves have to play a role in the negotiation of social norms and in the creation of these new 
opportunities for women. Therefore, Stern et al. (2005) are concerned with moving the focus of 
policies towards the processes that enable enable women to do so. Policy shifts away from 
focusing on outcomes towards focusing on the "processes for making decisions” (p. 258). 
Processes put emphasis on decision making spaces, where people are given a chance to come 
together and "forge social decisions" and this idea "goes beyond the mere aggregation of 
preferences." (p. 263) 
 Policies on empowerment should be based on "expanding" capabilities, freedom, and 
opportunities, specifically,  
 "Under an approach based on freedom, welfare analysis of a policy requires an 
assessment of whether it will expand the range of opportunities of an individual or his or her 
freedom to act." (Stern 2005, p 256) 
 For example, in the village of Ait Iktel in Morroco, two men who were migrants in 
neighboring cities returned to build a community well and found that collective action can be 
effective in bringing about change, and it built “trust and cooperation” among one another. These 
migrant men were "cultural translators," to the villagers. Because of their experiences outside, 
they could bring back with them "new possibilities” for what the village could do and be. This 
led them to form a village development association, which would pool together remittances from 
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migrant workers, and invest them in other community led development projects. This was a stark 
contrast to the way development projects worked in these villages, where villagers would usually 
"receive the new road, ambulance... as gifts from outside." (World Bank 2002, as cited in Stern 
2005, p. 259) Pigg (1993), is a linguistic anthropologist, who highlights that the word 
'development' in Nepal, though translates to mean the same thing (as growth, or economic 
change) in its Sankrit origins as it does in English. However, in terms of signification, 
‘development’ represents things that are material, and also foreign. Development takes its 
meaning from being non-Nepali or not local. But in this example from Morroco, we see a case, 
where development, comes from within, from an individual level. The villagers took advantage 
of the process of building the community well to "build a new organization, find new ways of 
behaving and a new capacity to solve problems.” With each projects, the villagers climb up a 
knowledge ladder, their preferences change, and they have new aspirations for themselves and 
their communities.  (Stern 2005, p. 259) 
Women as decision makers in the RCT literature 
 Stern et al. (2005) had emphasized on policies that focus on processes of how decisions 
are made for a society, rather than the outcomes they can generate. One of these processes 
involve having women in the decision making spaces, in the household or in the community. 
Duflo (2012) envisions empowerment in a similar way,  and under three subsections, writes 
about  "Women as Decision makers... Within the Household.. On the Farm... And Within the 
Community... as Policy Makers." However, her assumptions on economic behavior expose some 
of the same limitations I have pointed out earlier in the intra-household bargaining models, 
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particularly to do with  the neoclassical idea of individual preferences. This is especially relevant 
in the next section where I review three RCT studies on women's political participation.  
 In the household level, since micro finance and conditional transfers are often aimed at 
women, on the basis that it will be put towards more productive outcomes, these programs also 
"implicitly recognizing that women are not entirely powerless" and that the members of the 
household have different preferences from one another, because "if households were harmonious 
entities... then the nominal ownership of money would not matter within the household," and it 
would not make a difference if the money was given to a man or a woman. (p. 1070)   
 It is important to note that the framework by which Dulfo (2012) analyses behavior of the 
members of the household is through the intra-household bargaining models. She writes that 
families are neither ruled by dictator [not] without discord,"mediate from cooperation to non 
cooperation, and members "have different preferences and ideas." (p. 1066) Duflo (2012) gives 
examples from other RCTs that also show this phenomena at play.  Since there is a "lack of 45
congruence in preferences," between a wife and her husband,  if woman are able to hide 
information, such as concealing their choice to use contraceptives from their husbands, then 
there is a lower incidence of fertility (Ashraf et. al. 2012, as cited in Duflo 2012, p 1066). One of 
the reasons why rotational savings have gained popularity, among women, is that it is a way "for 
 In another recent study in the RCT literature, Ashraf et al. (2017) expand from the intra-household bargaining 45
models, where it is assumed that husband and the wife are they key players in the bargaining process, to include 
girls as agents who can change their parent’s education investment decisions.  Their experiment is based in schools 
in Zambia, where they find that girls are not taught skills to financially support themselves or assert themselves 
among others (especially older males), and often end up dropping out of school and marrying at an early age 
because they are economically dependent on men. This also puts them in the risk of HIV contamination and 
unwanted pregnancy. They examine whether teaching girls negotiation and interpersonal communication skills, on 
top of making them more aware of HIV, fertility, and the importance of staying in schools, can ultimately lead them 
to persuade their parents to invest more towards their education attainment. 
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women to keep savings away from their husbands" (Anderson and Baland 2002, as cited in 
Duflo 2012, p. 1067)  
 We see something similar on the farms as well, concerning land rights. Women's lands 
might be less productive, because women might have a weaker bargaining ability in the 
household, and therefore a lesser access to agriculture inputs. Even if women can rent her land to 
her husband, which would increase the productivity of that land and of the entire household, 
women usually never opt for this. This is because women have more insecure rights to property 
in these places, and there is more risk involved if a woman gives up farming rights to her 
husband, than the other way around. Instead, they continue to produce in their own individual 
lands, and this leads to "sheer waste, and literally makes families poorer" (Goldstein and Urdy 
2005, as cited in Duflo 2012, p. 1070). 
  This last example about women forgoing giving their lands to their husbands also show 
that men and women will have “different policy preferences,” since for women, secure rights to 
their land, is key for increasing the productivity of her land. But women also want "policies that 
better reflect their own priorities" and that will "increase their bargaining power.” (p. 1070) This 
is the topic of discussion in Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004).  
 Before moving on, I should emphasize that all of these examples reinforce the fact that 
women are driven by strong, individual preferences. Women are driven by both self interests, 
such is the case when they chose to conceal their contraceptive choice, and which is why 
rotational savings are so popular. But at the same time, women are also more altruistic than men 
are towards overall household wellbeing, which studies about effects of transfer payments and 
micro-credit on children's health show. Women are more altruistic towards their children, 
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because they are guided by a different set of preferences than men. So the idea of fixed, 
individual preferences is still maintained. However, how these preferences are formed, is left out 
of this literature.  
Literature review of women's political participation 
Fixed preferences in Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004):  
 In 1993, an amendment to the Indian constitution was made to transfer more control 
(over expenditures) to local village councils. Then under the present reservation policy, a third of 
the local village councils in India, known as Gram Panchayats (GPs), are randomly selected by 
the state to be reserved for women as positions of chief. They select a new batch of reserved GPs 
in every election cycle. While voters elect council members, the council members elect a 
Pradhan and a Upa-Pradhan (vice-chief). So in the reserved councils, only women can be elected 
as the Pradhan. Across all GPs, it is also mandated that at least a third of the seats of council 
members, be reserved for women. (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, p. 1410) 
 Chattopadhayay and Duflo (2004) look into the type of complaints that are bought to a 
woman village chief of reserved GPs.  They are able to take advantage of a mandated 
representation policy in India, as a random and exogenous event, that ushered women into local 
politics. They study whether there is any gendered outcomes in policy decisions, in terms of the 
type of public goods that are provisioned. This study has initiated two other seminal papers in the 
political participation literature (Beaman and Duflo 2009; and Beaman et al. 2012), which will 
be analyzed in their respective order. The first study is based in two Indian states of Rajasthan 
and West Bengal, while the subsequent studies are based in West Bengal.  
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 Chattopadhayay and Duflo  (2004) compare investments in public goods made in 
reserved and unreserved GPs. They find that the reservation not only alters policy decisions, but 
the decisions made reflect women’s preferences over men's. There are no significant differences 
between the reserved and unreserved GPs (in terms of sample characteristics), given the random 
selection. They also control for other characteristics in the leaders that may explain for the policy 
decisions, but find that no other characteristics except for the gender of the leaders, explains for 
the outcomes. (p. 1411) 
 Chattopadhayay and Duflo (2004) make their inferences about the effects of a reservation 
policy from the idea of a representative democracy where citizens get elected based on the 
voter's preferences, so the elected citizens are representative of the voters. In particular, they look 
at the citizen candidate model of electoral competition where citizens chose whether to run as 
candidates, and the winner “implements their favorite policy.” There are citizens, who have 
“preferences…over a set of policies,” which represents what their position is. Each of them 
choose whether to run for the election or not, and if they do, they can implement their favorite 
policy. (Osbourne and Slivinski 1996, p. 65) The cost for running can be high, especially for 
women, and they have to compare it next to the benefits from winning.There is also perfect 
information among the citizens, in that "citizens know each other’s preferences, and can 
influence the final political outcome, by choosing whom to elect" (Chattopadhayay and Duflo 
2004, p. 1415). This is an important assumption that I will return to later.  
 The decisions to run or not is based on the probability of them getting elected, over a 
fixed cost for running for an election.  The runnings costs make a case of why there should be 
reservations, because running costs, in the absence of a reservation, tend to be higher for women. 
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When running costs are high, only women with “strong pro-women preferences run.” (p. 1417) 
These women are described as being not representative of the average woman. Reservations are 
also important, when women and men don’t have the same preferences (yet it’s less costly for 
men to run), as Duflo (2012), suggests that not only in the household bargaining process, but also 
in the public sphere, men and women have different policy preferences. So when preferences do 
not match and running costs are high, reservations that give quotas to women chiefs, improves 
the “median” or the average “women’s utility” significantly, by electing someone who wouldn’t 
have participated otherwise (p. 1419).  
 In other words, each voters in the group try to maximize their utility, and each person 
wants an outcome that benefits them the most. Median women, are the middle group of voters 
that have the ability to cast the decisive votes in the elections. Without reservations, both male 
and female candidates must have an equal chance of winning, in order to have an outcome 
around the median (male and female) voter's preference. The reservation gives a chance to voters 
to elect women who would not have run previously, but their preference match the most to the 
voter’s preferences, rather than women with the most extreme pro-women policies. (DeSilva 
2016) 
 However, these assumptions raise some important questions and issues. Though the 
reservation puts more women in the positions of a village chief and gives a chance for women 
who would not have otherwise ran, and this itself is valuable, is there something we loose by 
moving away from electing "strong women" with "pro-women" preferences, versus electing 
average women? While the "strong women" are the outliers, the median women, represent the 
average or in other words, the norm, so they would also be less likely to deviate from social 
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expectations about about their roles. And while the policy outcomes, do reflect the preferences of 
women, is it enough to be constituted as empowerment? Especially, when it might not be making 
any transformative change in the prevailing gender inequities. Finally, Chattopadhayay and 
Duflo (2004) base their model on the citizen candidate model, as it would function in a 
representative democracy. This means that policy decisions is made by a casting a vote on 
people's fixed preferences, which is essentially a way of aggregating individual preferences, to 
make social decisions (that was made popular by Arrow 1963).  
 Turning to the results, the authors find that policy outcomes are closer to what women 
want compared to what men want. They find this out by testing whether Pradhans act towards 
complaints lodged by women more in reserved GPs as opposed to unreserved GPs. The cost of 
complaining for women decreases if the Pradhan is a woman. With the reservations, women have 
more incentives to bring out complaints they feel strongly about. Women Pradhans, under the 
reservation policy, invest more in public goods linked to women’s needs. They invest in drinking 
water and roads in West Bengal, and drinking water in Rajasthan. (p. 1429) However, the authors 
point out that it is not that a woman Pradhan is more “sensitive” and responsive to the complaints 
of women, or even both men and women. Simply, the outcomes are more favorable for women, 
because the preference of the Pradhan herself  is more aligned to the preference of the women. 
(p. 1431- 1434)These results are unaffected even after controlling for women’s characteristics. 
For example, usually poorer and more illiterate women are elected when there is a reservation, 
but the outcomes are not affected by "weakness" of the women candidates (p. 1436).  
 Duflo (2012) suggests that the results from Chattopadhayay and Duflo (2004) show that 
women leaders "better represent the needs of women" and that "women are changing the realities 
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on the ground." This study is evident of the fact that women are occupying decision making 
spaces and play a defining role in creating new realities for other women, in line with their 
preferences. (p. 1071) However, the formation of women's preferences and needs is left out, and 
we encounter the same fate of the bargaining household models, where women come into the 
bargaining process with given and fixed preferences. Duflo (2012) also writes that the "patterns 
of complaints dovetails with gender responsibilities of men and women within the household and 
their employment opportunities” (p. 1070). While the policy outcomes reflect these complaints, 
in a space which is likely to have been male dominated, the outcomes themselves do not change 
"responsibilities" of men and women in the household. These complaints are made within their 
expected gender roles, and the outcomes do leave them unchanged, at least not directly. While it 
may now take less travel time for a woman to fetch drinking water from the well, and this frees 
up her productive time, she is still working within her assigned gender role. Beaman et. al. 
(2012) find that in West Bengal, where Pradhans had provided for clean water, the time spent on 
domestic work for girls has gone down by 18 minutes per day, but they conclude that this is not a 
significant amount of time freed to do other things.  Duflo (2012) does address this argument and 
writes,  
 "even if they (outcomes in Duflo (2004)) do not bring about radical changes in women's 
status or in the way women are perceived, policies targeted towards women can have immediate 
consequences." (p. 1074) 
 I am not negating the fact that reservations have an immediate consequences that are 
valuable to the empowerment of women involved on both ends, but simply allowing women to 
exercise their preferences (in the voting process or while lodging complaints), or implementing 
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their fixed preferences, does not capture the type of empowerment that Stern et al. (2005), Sen 
(1990), and other feminists (Kabeer 1999, Batliwala 1994) envision.  
 Beaman and Duflo (2009) study whether exposure to female leaders can change people's 
perceptions about them in leadership roles. They assume that as people are more exposed to 
female leaders, they will reduce their “bias" (p. 1497). Though Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) 
show that reservations can have an effect in types of public goods provisioning, reflecting 
preferences of women, “little is known on the effects on women's prospects to being elected, as 
well as the voter's attitudes on women as leaders” (p. 1498).  
 The authors use hypothetical leader evaluations and the The Implication Association 
Tests (IAT) to study people's perception towards their village leaders. The econometric survey 
was is to examine the backgrounds of female leaders in the GPs and whether the reservation 
policy could lead to better electoral prospects for women. The PRA survey measures if there is 
an gendered impact in the allocation of public goods, whether women leaders allocate public 
goods differently.  They sample villages in the Indian state of West Bengal that have had no 
reservation, one instance of reservation, and two or more instances of reservations. 
 In the econometric survey, they find that women are more likely to run and also to win 
elected seats in the GPs that have had more than two cycles of reservations (p. 1497). There are 
several channels through which reservations may have created a “pathway” for women to come 
into politics. First of all, there is a role model effect, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show that 
women are “more likely to attend and participate” meetings in reserved GPs. Female Pradhans 
may have also created and reinforced a strong "network for women politicians," and this is 
similar to a role model effect. Political parties may also have an incentive to find "suitable 
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female Pradhans," especially if it increases their chances of gaining power, so they may 
encourage female leaders to "identify and train" potential candidates. Chattopadhyay et al (2004) 
also showed that women make different policy decisions, and voters “may learn to identify” and 
associate with their preferences over time. (as cited in Beaman et al. 2009, p. 1513)  
 Results from tests that measure people's perception about male and female leaders (the 
IAT test), show that although "social norms and deep preferences," which segregate gender into 
different roles, is "hard to erode," but biases towards female leaders, lessen with two rounds of 
exposure. They write, unlike social norms, beliefs held on "effectiveness are much more 
malleable, and they play a role in voting decisions." (p. 1501) Before talking about the results 
and assumptions in more depth, we need to unpack the term "bias," and compare it to 
preferences. A bias can be a preference or taste towards something, in a way that is considered 
unfair. But at the same time, it is does not need to be deeply held. For example, a bias can simply 
be a liking or disliking of something. This makes sense in the context of a IAT test, which is an 
impulse based, categorization test, which measures the response time of people to associate 
certain characteristics with images, in this case of men or women leaders. Therefore, how much 
the study actually addresses the innateness of biases themselves is questionable. Tastes and 
preferences are in a sense, more strongly formed judgement, which is why the authors 
differentiate a change between bias, versus a change between more deeply seated preferences. As 
a result, it is clear that exposure reduces bias, but it is less clear whether this study has 
completely abandoned the idea of fixed preferences, and what we are seeing is a change in 
preferences.  
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 The assumptions that the authors make, is that reservations lead to more exposure, which 
reduces statistical discrimination, and therefore enhance women's electoral prospects. They 
assume that bias against females leaders are materialized through statistical or taste 
discrimination. In the absence of reservations, the two can also be “self reinforcing,” where taste 
discrimination, can prevent female candidates from being elected to the council and as Pradhans. 
This means that there is less information on the effectiveness of female leaders, for the 
subsequent election cycle, leading to statistical discrimination. Statistical discrimination is 
specifically prevalent when voters are “risk averse.” Therefore, having reservations for women, 
means that even if taste discrimination exists, it cannot prevent women from being elected into 
the GPs and as Pradhans . However, women's long run electoral prospects can improve, as 
reservations can reduce statistical discrimination. By ensuring that a certain number of women 
are elected, voters would have more information for successive rounds of elections, on the 
effectiveness of the female leaders.  (p. 1521) 
 Hypothetical leader evaluations show vignettes of a hypothetical leader making a speech, 
responding to complaints, and the respondents need to evaluate the leader's "perceived 
performance and effectiveness," in terms of whether she or he addressed the concerns properly, 
whether they would be good at allocating resources. They also hear the leaders choosing to 
invest between two projects, a drinking water or an irrigation project, and the choices that the 
male and women leaders make is varied, so their choices appear “gender neutral.” (p. 1422) The 
hypothetical leader evaluations are designed in such a way that there are no observable or 
unobservable differences within the hypothetical male and female differences, so the only 
difference attributed to their performances, is "inferred" by the respondents, because of statistical 
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discrimination. In other words, in villages where there was only reservations once, due to a lack 
of information on the effectiveness of female candidates, villagers have a preference for male 
leaders, out of familiarity, and therefore statistically discriminate. (p. 1526) They use an activity 
based IAT to see whether being exposed to female leaders would change gender stereotypes in 
occupations for men and women. The use two taste-based IATs to measure "explicit and implicit" 
taste for men and women leaders in general. The first test measure how closely respondents 
associate male and female names to positive and negative attributes (1523). And the second test 
measures how closely respondents associate male and female images to these attributes (p. 
1525). 
  The results show villages which never had a reservation, men judged male hypothetical 
leaders are being more effective than hypothetical female leaders. But being exposed to just one 
female leader, from reservations, can "erase statistical discrimination by the male villagers" (p. 
1528). In twice reserved GPs, the difference in the evaluations of male and female leaders 
become indistinguishable. Results from IAT study show that in never reserved GPs, both males 
and females associate leadership qualities with men, and domestic activities with women. In 
once reserved GPs, both men and women have still hold biases towards female leaders, and 
associate female leaders which more negative qualities compared to male leaders. However with 
time, voters are more likely to associate women with leadership attributes (p. 1533).  
 Discrimination persists against female leaders because of a lack of information about 
their effectiveness, therefore, people chose to discriminate. The authors conclude saying,  
 “Although reservation does not make male villagers more sympathetic to the idea 
of female leaders, out IAT and speech and vignette results [hypothetical leader 
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evaluation tests] suggest that it makes them more likely to associate women with 
leadership and improves their evaluation of female leaders.”  (p. 1533) 
  If people were to be more sympathetic towards women leaders, it could mean that they 
have a preference for female leaders. Or in other words, they would have built a taste for female 
leaders and taste discrimination would decrease. But there is no change in taste discrimination.  46
So what has happened through reservations is that there is an improvement in the information 
given to men and women about female leaders. Now women can also be seen as good leaders. 
Their taste has not changed, but their information sets have. The study shows the effect of a 
change in information, which is not that same as the effect of a change in preferences. But it is 
changes in preferences or the changes in what we value which initiates a change in deeply held 
gender roles (Stern 2005, p. 256). 
Change in preferences?  
 Beaman et al. (2012) find that reservations have long term effect, by changing the 
aspirations of parents for their daughters, and of adolescent girls for themselves, in terms of 
expanding ideas of what women are able to achieve, and in turn shaping education and career 
choices. The authors recognize gender as being "at least partially" socially constructed, and 
attribute to contributions from sociology and social cognitive theory, which "identifies belief in 
one's own ability (self efficacy) as a key mechanism for personal agency," and this aspiration in 
oneself, correlates with the education and career choices one makes. The way reservation leads 
to a change in aspirations of parents and children, is through a role model effect. Being able to 
 In their conclusion, Beaman et al. (2009) write that “results provide striking evidence that although ten years of 46
exposure to women leaders may not have changed voters' stated preference for male leaders, by giving voters a 
chance to learn about the effectiveness of women leaders, they have effectively improved women’s access to 
political office” (p. 1533) 
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see women in their own villages in a non-stereotypical occupation of a political leader, breaks 
stereotypes about gender roles, helps other girls, as well as their parents, identify more easily 
with them, and see a different roles of oneself or their daughters. (p. 582)  
 The authors carry out a household survey to measure educational attainment, and a time 
use survey on how much adults and adolescents spend on various agricultural and domestic 
activities. Then an adult questionnaire asks parent's about their aspirations for adolescents, where 
the four questions cover different aspects of aspirations.  They find that in villages with no 47
reservations, parents have higher aspirations for boys. But in villages with two election cycles, 
the gap in aspirations for boys an girls shrinks. But given that the aspirations of parents for boys 
has not changed, the only reason why the gap between aspirations for boys and girls has shrunk, 
is because parents have higher aspirations for girls. (p. 584) 
 However, the authors also try to see whether changing opportunities for women, in 
education, or in the labour market, led to these change in aspirations, and modified education and 
occupation choices. Duflo (2012) had reasoned that empowerment can be achieved by changing 
the external environment or the constraints that are faced by resource poor households. 
Increasing opportunities in the labour market, and providing more information to parents on 
returns to education, could give parents more incentives to invest in women's human capital. 
Stern et al. (2005) distinguishes between the effects of changing information, about the types of 
jobs that women can do, and the opportunities that exist for them, versus, the effects of changing 
preferences of parents about the different roles that women can play, when assessing how policy 
can be most effective. Beaman et al. (2012) find that reduction in the gender gap in education is 
 They are, "wishes child to have a high-education job, wishes child to marry after 18, wishes child to graduate or 47
get higher education, wished child to be Pradhan"
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not due to a "change in the [external] environment.” Specifically, they find that reservations 
made no improvements to the education or labour market outcomes of people aged between 16 
to 30 years. These are the people who parents of the current adolescents would look up to to 
“form expectations” about their children's future, and gain information in terms of expected 
returns to education. There is also no evidence that female leaders invested towards expanding 
opportunities in education for girls by investing more in educational infrastructure. (p. 585) 
 There are two channels through which reservations and having women as leaders can 
change aspirations. Female leaders can change aspirations of parents and girls by initiating 
policies that make running easier for women, and therefore, show girls that it is possible to be in 
roles such as a Pradhan, which they didn't think was possible before. I understand this to mean as 
expanding the choice sets available to a woman in a “material” level (Kabeer 1999, p. 442). This 
could also mean, as Stern et al. (2005) would suggest, that there is a change in women's “external 
constraints” (p. 225).  Or female leaders can change aspirations by simply being a role model of 
a "successful woman.” This channel can mean expanding the choice sets, or alternative set of 
realities available to women in a discursive and imaginative level (Kabeer 1999, p. 442). In Stern 
et al. (2005) and Appadurai's (2004) term, this would mean relaxing women’s internal constraints 
(in terms of self perceptions and what they think they are able to do).  
 However, as mentioned above, Beaman et al. (2012) highlight that aspirations were not 
changed through a change in people's external environment. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) 
showed that female leader invest in public goods that are more in line with preferences of 
women.  This would have decreased the time that girls spend on domestic chores. By this 
reasoning, female leaders could also have invested more into the schooling of girls. However, 
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there is less evidence that aspirations were changed through this channel, by expanding 
economic opportunities.  The role model effect started in the second cycle of elections, and 48
there is evidence for why this is was the pathway through which female leaders raised aspirations 
if we considered the time it took for the effect to take place (p. 585).  In the first reservation 
cycle, there is change in the type of public goods that are provisioned by women leaders 
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). By the second reservation cycle, there is no difference in the 
provisioning of public goods, between once or twice reserved GPs. Beaman et al. (2009) had 
suggested that in the first reservation cycle, voters have low opinions for women as leaders 
compared to men, but in twice reserved GPs, voters have a chance to update their information 
about the effectiveness of female leadership and see them in a more positive light. They are also 
more likely to elect women in GPs for unreserved seats. Therefore the authors of the 2012 study, 
Beaman et al. (2012) can conclude that,  
 "The timing of the effect on aspirations and education is consistent with the time it takes 
for female leaders to be seen in a positive light.” (p. 586) 
 Stern et al. (2005) had made an argument that preferences can change, even in the 
absence of an economic change. What Beaman et al. (2012) show is that even without increasing 
economic opportunities, parents were able to change aspirations for their daughters. Increasing 
educational and occupational opportunities must not be confused with increasing freedoms and 
opportunities, in the capability approach. But when women leaders are a role model to girls and 
their parents, they create new possibilities about the roles that women and girls are able to play. 
 The time spent on domestic chores for girls only decreased by 18 minutes. 48
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This idea is closer to the capability approach. The choices, opportunities, and freedoms do not 
only exist in a material, economic sense, but they also exist at the discursive level.  
Final notes on political participation and empowerment 
 Rather than focusing on policy outcomes, Stern et al. (2005) highlighted that policy 
should focus on the processes of how social decision making is carried out. Reservations ensure 
that women are able to occupy decision making spaces, by being a member as well as a leaders 
of village councils, which are important spaces where the communities negotiate the allocation 
of public resources. The literature on political participation and reservations, is also centered 
around analyzing a woman outside of her household and in her community. While studies on 
micro-credit and cash transfers that are reviewed in Duflo (2012) still assume that a woman’s 
default place is in the household (p. 1066).  
 There are three outcomes of the reservation policies. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) 
suggests that the provision of public goods when the Pradhan is a woman, is more in line with 
preferences of other women in the villages. Beaman et al. (2009) find that exposure to female 
leaders lowers statistical discrimination, and therefore voter's bias against women as leaders. 
Women are also more likely to run in elections in twice reserved GPs. Beaman et al. (2012) find 
that reservations in the long term, changes the aspirations of girls of themselves, and aspirations 
of parents for their daughters, and as a result, the gender gap in education attainment decreases. 
Are these outcomes evidence of empowerment?  
 I have used the argument earlier that empowerment is the “ability to make 
choices” (Kabeer 1999, p. 436) and choices that are in line with one's preferences.  However, 
preferences are socially constructed are thus are changeable (Agarwal 1997). Gender 
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empowerment can therefore be seen as a process in which existing preferences of women are 
challenged and reformed, as well as the preferences of other towards women. Women's own 
preferences might be not need to change, but what may be constraining them is the preferences 
of others towards women and what they should be and do. Empowerment goes beyond changing 
women's self perception about their abilities but also other people's perceptions towards women. 
Empowerment should give women an ability aspire for more and see a different't role to oneself. 
This Sen’s (1999) idea of expanding freedoms, where women have more choices and 
possibilities that are socially acceptable. But women also should have a role in expanding 
freedoms, in negotiating social norms, and creating these new opportunities.  
 Finally, we need to be able to identify a change in preferences and also who's preferences 
are being changed (Stern et al. 2005).  The Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) study may be about 
making choices based on women's preferences, while findings in the second and third paper 
show a possibility that preferences of others towards women may have changed. These are 
voter's preferences for women as leaders and also preferences of parents towards the type of 
women they want their daughters to be. A girl's own preferences for the future may have changed 
and part of her change in aspirations comes from how others (and mainly her parents) see her 
abilities.  
 These papers look at participation on a more instrumental way, relative to women's 
empowerment, by measuring the impacts of having women as leaders on a community. But the 
act of women participating as members of the Panchayat or as Pradhans, is also a part of 
empowerment in its intrinsic sense, because reservations ensure that women have a role in public 
decision making spaces. Even if the same outcomes above were achieved and still benefited 
!88
women, but was a result of a top down intervention, such as through the role of the government 
or by a group of male decision makers (in the GPs), it is qualitatively different from women 
giving an opportunity to be in those roles. 
 In Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), while women occupy a decision making space and 
decide on outcomes that are in line with preferences of other women, preferences itself are given 
as fixed, and the types of complaints made by women or the public goods that are distributed do 
not make any transformative change in women's preexisting gender roles. This study also reads 
like the social choice literature, because the Pradhans are in a sense aggregating individual 
preferences of the voters and giving people what they want.  49
 In Beaman et al. (2009), after two reservation cycles there is a change in voters' bias 
towards female leaders, but that does not mean there is a change in their preferences. The authors 
make the assumption that reservations increase voter's information about female leaders and that 
reduces statistical discrimination, while taste discrimination does not necessarily change. They 
are following neoclassical theories of discrimination, which makes discrimination a phenomena 
that can be explained through rational choice, people chose to discriminate out of prejudice or a 
lack of information.  They also largely ignore that discrimination can be an institutional 50
phenomena, which can persist, even if people do not choose to discriminate (Albelda et al. 
 And also because what the average women want is what the female Pradhan herself wants. 49
 Becker suggests that a person has a “taste to discriminate,” when they “experiences disutility from associating 50
with certain people” so there is a “willingness to pay to avoid” any connections with those people. Discriminators 
can be consumers, employers and employees, who are rational individuals, who are exercising their preferences, and 
thus maximizing their utility. (as cited in Albelda et al. 2009, p. 90-93) Statistical discrimination arises because of an 
information failure, when (still rational) agents have to make decisions “under conditions of imperfect and 
incomplete information.” Information problem means that there are high transaction costs (“time plus money spent 
to identify and negotiate price, quality, or location of employers and employees”), and so employers have an 
incentive to apply stereotypes and widely held characteristics of the group to an individual member, rather than 
“base hiring or wage setting decisions on the individual’s actual abilities.” Unlike the first type of discrimination, 
this isn’t based on taste and prejudice. (Albelda et al. 2009, p. 93-96)
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2009).  If preferences were to change, there may have been a decrease in taste discrimination, 
because in this form of discrimination, people choose to discriminate because they have a fixed 
preference about certain groups of people over others. These preferences can be in the form of 
more deeply held prejudices but not necessarily biases. In short, taste discrimination means that 
people hold prejudices against others and choose to discriminate, while statistical discrimination 
is not based on prejudice. What we see here is the effect of a change in information, and not 
preferences. By this logic voters are not inherently prejudiced towards women, but they simply 
want a good leader. Voters have a taste or preference for a good leader. But their information set 
of what constitutes a good leader is based on things they see. If there are no women leaders to 
draw from, then there is an information failure. Thus they associate good leadership qualities 
with men. The two cycles of reservations update their information set of what constitute a good 
leader, and now they are more likely to identify with women as leaders .   51
 To sum up, Beaman et al. (2009) still maintains the idea of fixed preferences, a 
neoclassical understanding of discrimination, and sees the behavior change as an effect of 
information change. However,  Beaman et al. (2012) may be showing a gradual shift away from 
the neoclassical models of fixed preferences, since it  posits a possibility that preferences are 
changing of parents and young girls, through a role model effect.  
 In Beaman et al. (2012), without even increasing any economic opportunities, parents 
change their aspirations for their daughters and the gender gap in education attainment shrinks. 
 The IAT test looks at how our brain associates certain attributes to men and women (Beaman et al. 2009). 51
However, in this paper, it is not clear whether a bias is the same as a prejudice. Since people don’t have enough 
information, they fall back on their implicit bias. Simply from their social experiences, learning from what they see, 
they associate certain attributes to gender. This is what the authors assume with information failure. It is not that 
people are consciously discriminating, but they subconsciously rely on implicit associations, because they don’t 
have enough information about women as leaders. Prejudice may be something more conscious and have a 
deliberate action towards people. 
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Increasing aspirations means to project different possibilities of what one can be.  Increasing 
economic opportunities through the labour market or by investing in more education, does not 
seem to be enough. These findings seem more in line with the idea of increasing freedoms, 
opportunities, and capabilities. 
 However, is the role model effect not the same as reducing a person's statistical bias? In 
Beaman et al. (2012), changing an individual's aspiration changes an individual's own 
assessment of their capabilities (parent's assessments of their daughters capabilities, and 
daughter's of themselves). Whereas the Beaman et al. (2009) study is concerned with changing 
other people's assessments about women's capabilities, which is understood as changing biases 
about what a woman can do. But in either cases, there is an expansion of capabilities.  
 This leads us to two question. Is changing a girl's own information set about what she is 
capable of, as the role model effect implies, the same as changing preferences? While changing 
other people's information about a woman, as reducing bias implies, not considered a change in 
preferences? 
 Beaman et al. (2012) try to account for this by trying to control for the change in 
education attainment and labour market attainment of young adults. These are the age group that 
parents look towards to gain information on returns to education for their adolescent daughters. 
By showing that this information channel has no affect on aspirations, and education choice, they 
isolate a role model effect as the channel by which aspirations and subsequently education 
decision change in favor of women.  
 The final set of contradiction is if we treat our end goal as positive labour market or 
education outcomes for girls, then does it matter much to separate the effects of a change in 
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information from the effects of a change in preferences, in how we assess this policy outcome? If 
both mechanisms can be effective, shouldn't policy work through both channels simultaneously? 
We’ve come across this issue in Stern et al. (2005). In this case, the end goal in a sense, or the 
desired outcome, is not just to increase education and labour market outcomes for girls. But the 
authors also measure other aspects of aspirations that are not related to education and the careers 
the children will go on to have. The authors also want to see if parents have aspirations for their 
daughters to become a Pradhan one day.  A Pradhan is not like the other jobs in the labour 
market. So the fact that their results show that parent's have more aspirations for their daughters 
to become Pradhans after the reservations, suggests that these are aspirations change for types of 
roles in the future that cannot be accounted for with information about returns to education. 
!92
Conclusion: 
 It seems that in Stern (2005) or in the findings from a reservation policy in Beaman 
(2012) that the rhetoric of development policies has been changing towards providing spaces to 
allow women to openly contest social norms and change their preferences or the preferences of 
others towards them, and essentially create new ideas and images of femininity. But the question 
still remains: to what extent is the mainstream development economics literature still boxed into 
the neoclassical paradigm, and how much progress has there been in accommodating feminist 
critiques?  
 I chose to focus on the branch of development RCT literature concerning women’s 
political participation because it more clearly showed a movement away from neoclassical 
assumptions of fixed preferences towards the idea of endogenous preferences, which made 
evident that some policies targeted at the political empowerment of women can change social 
norms (along the line of gender roles) and gender relations.  
 Others have also tried to integrate these ideas into more mainstream economics literature 
supported by studies such as Beaman et al. (2012). Hoff and Stiglitz (2017) who “attempt to 
broaden [the] economic discourse” by bringing in the idea that individual behavior is socially 
determined, and that our social influences shape behavior by changing our preferences and 
perceptions. Although they largely attribute these insights to behavioral economics, a field that I 
have not explored in my paper, the implications of the behavioral literature on mainstream 
economics is nonetheless the same as the implications from feminist economists, that our 
experiences and social norms can change our preferences and self perceptions (Sen). Their 
understanding of individuals as social beings is similar to what we have seen in Sen (1990), 
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where “prolonged exposure to a given social context shapes who people are” (Hoff and Stiglitz 
2017, p. 26). One of the particular avenues they suggest through which individual preferences 
can be changed is through exposure to female leaders, where they are referring to the role model 
effect that was evident in Beaman (2012).  52
 Chopra and Muller (2016), in a publication that tries to link ideas that have emerged 
about women’s empowerment to development practices,  write that the role model effects for 53
younger generation of girls as seen in Beaman et al. (2012) does not only change their self-
aspirations but “have in turn the power to slowly change gender roles over time” (p. 5). Though I 
have not come across feminist literature that has picked up directly on role model effects that 
Beaman et al. (2012) find, Kabeer (2005) talks about women’s participation in local politics in a 
positive light, and her reasoning can give us a way of reinterpreting the findings from 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo’s (2004).  She focuses her discussions on the GPs in India and the 54
reservation policy for women and minorities. Although there can be an elite capture of women 
from higher castes, or women may be “proxies” for their husbands or other men in their 
families,  she suggests that over time “women become more experienced in the political arena” 55
and gain “self confidence.” As they start to believe in themselves as independent, and competent 
 Hoff and Stiglitz (2017) cite Beaman et al. (2009, 2012) to highlight how “rigidities" in societies can be overcome 52
when “beliefs and preferences of large numbers of individuals change” as a result of an exogenous event such as the 
“political reservations for women as village leaders in randomly selected villages in India” (p. 30). 
 “Connecting Perspectives on Women’s Empowerment” is a report published by the Institute of Development 53
Studies in 2016, and is largely concerned with explaining how ideas of empowerment have evolved and how it can 
link to development. 
 Though Kabeer (2005) is more critical of the agenda that has tried to usher them into national politics, and the 54
limited effects it has actually on women’s empowerment, she sees the importance of having woman in local politics, 
as the decisions made at that level directly implicates the lives of the poor.
 Female leader’s characteristics was something that Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) had controlled for the same 55
reasons, Pradhans under the reservations tended to come from more poorer and illiterate backgrounds. They find that 
this channel has no effect. 
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leaders, they also begin to question existing “priorities of the panchayat” that may have not 
benefitted their own interests, and over time their presence gives a chance for “different set of 
priorities to be expressed” that were not possible before.  
 It is not clear whether Kabeer (2005) may be referring to Chattopadhyay and Duflo’s 
(2004) findings,  though it can be likely that she is as the outcomes are very similar. But it is 56
interesting that she places emphasis on the fact that building confidence in one’s own leadership 
ability, instead of relying on the abilities of other men in their family, and then being able to 
assert one’s own set of priorities over existing (and more likely male-centric) priorities, can have 
a positive effect on changing gender relations and roles over time. Seeing Chattopadhyay and 
Duflo (2004) from this perspective, may lead us to interpret their findings in a different way, and 
not by simply exposing the limitations of individual preferences, as I have done earlier. The fact 
that women are able to bring forward their priorities, can set into motion newer ways of 
imagining women’s roles in society. Beaman et al. (2009) show that voters over time start to see 
the effectiveness of female leaders and are more likely to vote for them in even unreserved GPs. 
And over a longer term, Beaman et al. (2012) shows that female leaders have an effect on 
changing parents aspirations towards what sort of women they would like their daughters to be, 
and also change aspirations of girls themselves.  
 However, using these studies and particularly the implications that Beaman (2012) has 
had, I cannot argue that this is the norm throughout the mainstream development literature. In the 
micro-finance literature, one does not have to look hard to find studies that show the limited 
 I had argued that because the study still maintains the idea of fixed preference, being able simply exercise one’s 56
own preference does not adequately capture women's empowerment, if part of empowerment is also captured by 
preference change. 
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abilities of micro-credit loans on women’s empowerment.  Cornwall (2016) is critical of how 57
micro-credit, or access to financial resources, translates to the types of empowerment that 
feminists have advocated for. Access to resources also does not ensure a “shift in consciousness" 
of women. Women need to be both aware and able to assert themselves from restrictive gender 
roles and expectations that keep them “locked into situations of subordination and 
dependency.” (p. 345) From the RCT literature, Banerjee et al. (2009) find that women who took 
out loans in the treatment areas were no more likely to make decisions on household spending, 
investment, or education of their children.   Households in treatment areas are also not more 58
likely to have their girls enrolled in school.  (p. 14) But as Kabeer (1999) has pointed out,  59 60
decision making on children’s health and education can be pre-assigned to women’s roles as 
mothers, and therefore a change in this decision making ability does not represent a change in 
agency of women in a transformative sense. In the case of micro finance, studies have therefore 
pointed out that there is a change in neither of those things.  
 Cornwall (2016) also writes that though the “World Bank has taken up Kabeer’s (1999) 
work” on defining and measuring empowerment, it has emphasized more on the access to 
financial resources or “assets” dimensions, and has largely ignored the “relational nature of 
 At the same time, there are also studies from feminists (Kabeer 2001, 2005) which show that micro-credit does 57
lead to positive outcomes, in places where women have been “excluded" from the formal economy, having access to 
micro-credit loans has “led to changes in women’s own perceptions and their role in household decision making.”
 The assumption was based on findings by Lundberg et al. (1997) who among many other studies compare 58
decisions of men and women on child health and education, and show that women spend more on health and 
education of their children. So giving women more spending ability, should also increase not only these outcomes, 
but also their “decision making” ability or “bargaining power.” (as cited in Banerjee et al. 2009)
 The authors of “Poor Economics,” Banerjee and Duflo (2011) also comment on studies about the effects of micro-59
finance on women’s lives, “on the other hand, there was no sign of a radical transformation. We found no evidence 
that women were feeling more empowered, at least along measurable dimensions. They were not, for example, 
exercising greater control over how the household spent its money. Nor did we see any differences in spending on 
education or health, or in the probability that kids would be enrolled in private schools.”
 I write about this in chapter 2.60
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empowerment.” (p. 345) The relational nature of empowerment highlights the importance of 
relationships and an understanding that the individual is a part of a collective. So it cannot be left 
up to the individual woman to change more structural gender inequalities that inflict might them. 
However, in cases from India and Bangladesh, women’s engagement with micro-finance 
organizations in the long run and being a part of group, has opened up avenues for their 
empowerment elsewhere, such as showing more instances of political participation (Kabeer 
2005, p. 18).  
 Political participation is one of the routes towards women’s empowerment. Policies such 
as the reservation system in India puts women in decision making spaces, and they are not 
simply occupying  these spaces in a token way, but are also active participants. Reservations over 
time have also changed perceptions about what women are able to do in society. However, there 
are obvious limitations of having such a narrow focus.  One form of empowerment cannot be 
generalized into other parts of a woman’s lives (Cornwall 2016). The effect of reservation 
policies in India on women’s political empowerment also cannot be applicable to experience in 
other countries with different political and social context. Finally, this particular positive instance 
in development and policy making, cannot be generalized to the success development and policy 
making has had on other parts of women’s empowerment.  
 But if we can take away one thing then it might be the fact that the mainstream 
economics literature, in development and in general, is potentially becoming more in tune 
towards something that is fundamentally true about us men and women, that we are a part of 
something bigger than us (whether it is our family or the academic institution we are in), and our 
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ideas, desires, and aspirations are always being shaped, challenged, and changed by what we are 
surrounded by.  
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